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ABSTRACT
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Data,
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M.S. University of Massachusetts, Ph.D.,
University of
,

Massachusetts

Directed by:

Dr. H.

Swaminathan

Time series designs are considered the best
class of designs

available to social scientists engaged in applied
research where "true

experimental designs are not possible.

However, in applied settings

it is not sufficient that a research design
be technically elegant;

it is equally important that the research
be politically and philo-

sophically sensitive to issues which arise within the
applied research setting.

The purpose of this study was to examine the tech-

nical logic of time series designs as well as the efficacy
of strict

experimental explanation in applied research.
Part

I

presented two time series procedures based on the

general linear model.

Procedure one compared the degree of the curve

for the entire series with the degree of the curve for the pre- or

post-treatment curve (whichever has more points).
using Hotelling's T
polynomial.

A test statistic

was developed to determine the degree of the

If the degree of the entire curve is the same as the

degree of the pre- or post-treatment curve then there is no evidence
for a treatment effect.

On the other hand, if the degrees are

Vll

different then there is evidence that
the treatment had an effect.

Procedure one requires means for data
points, however, the analysis
may be carried out with considerably
fewer observations than current
designs for single observations per
time point.
The procedure two model developed
a simultaneous test for

serial correlation and polynomial
trend in single observation series.

Initially the model was developed for a
first order autoregressive
scheme and a linear trend in the series.

Subsequently, the model was

extended to include higher order autoregression
schemes and polynomial trends.
The model was tested on data generated from
a first order

autoregressive scheme without linear trend.
mated the autocorrelation parameters,

p

Although the model esti-

and y, adequately, it was

not powerful enough to detect simulated treatment
effects in the

prsence of a positive autoregressive parameter.

This result was

attributed to the way in which y effected the estimate of the
treatment effect.

In spite of this limitation, procedure two is useful

when the autoregressive parameter is negative or when the researcher
is interested in examining the details of the autoregressive
error

process
Part II of this study examined the predominant model of

explanation in applied research settings.

It was argued that explicit

attempts to replace intentional or teleological concepts with causal
concepts in explaining human behavior and action resulted in
course that was cumbersome and distorting.

a

dis-

In many instances it

Vlll
seemed more appropriate to explain
an event or action by referring
to the agent's intentions rather
than objective causes.

An agent-

relational perspective was proposed as an
alternative to the causal
perspective.

Examples were given to illustrate when an
event or

action is best subsumed under a particular
perspective (i.e., causal
or agent-relational).
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OVERTURE

A Coat

I made my song a coat
Covered with embroideries
Out of old mythologies
From heel to throat;
But the fools caught it.
Wore it in the world's eyes
As though they'd wrought it.
Song, let them take it.
For there's more enterprise
In walking naked.

W. B. Yeats

A doctoral thesis

is like a coat.

fashioned into an appropriate form;
current styles and tradition.

Woven from ideas, it is

a form determined by idiosyncracy

And like the beggar's tattered tweed

jacket or the aristocrat's stylish midlength London
Fog, it becomes an

external mark of social status.
So my thesis is like a coat.

wear it.
I

have woven it and

I

I

will

But its real value does not lie in its physical properties.

do not have a doctoral thesis.

To be sure, I do.

What

I

mean is

that the thesis expresses a constellation of relationships that
go

beyond its physical properties.
ive of relationships and

I

I

think that songs are very express-

would therefore prefer to view my thesis as a

song:
I

And now that

I

made my song a coat

.

.

am done others may steal my coat or they may think it

amusing or want it.

But in any case

I

will always have my song.

PART

I

TIME SERIES ANALYSIS

"If you knew Time as well as I do", said the Hatter, "you wouldn't talk
about wasting it.
It's him".
"I don't know what you mean", said Alice.

"Of course you don't!" the Hatter said, tossing his head contemptuously.
"I dare say you never even spoke to Time!"

"Perhaps not", Alice cautiously replied, "but
when I learn music".
"Ah!

That accounts for it", said the Hatter.

I

know

I

have to beat time

"He won't stand beating.

Alice in Wonderland

CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Time series designs hold a
unique and perhaps paradoxical

position in the methodology literature.

These designs are considered

the best class of designs
available to social scientists
engaged in

applied research where "true"
experimental designs are not possible
(Campbell, 1963).
However. Campbell and Stanley
(1963) remark that
these designs were typical of
classical nineteenth- century experimen-

tation in the physical and biological
sciences;

in these settings the

designs are seen as "true" rather
than "quasi" experimental designs.

A contradiction is suggested by a
design which can be considered either
as a true or as a quasi experimental
procedure.

It ma^ be possible

to reconcile this contradiction by
viewing the general logic of time

series methods as fulfilling the
requirements of traditional scientific

inference as well as reflecting the organization
of ordinary experience.
Specifically, the general logic of time series
work involves studying
the temporal contiguity of events, that
is, causes and their effects.

However, no attempt will be made to deal explicitly
with this apparent

duality within time series designs.

Instead the technical logic of

time series is examined on the one hand, and on the
other, the efficacy
of strict experimental explanation is scrutinized.

A thesis divided

into two parts is presented.
In part I methods to analyze time series data are reviewed
and

new methods to analyze this type of data are suggested.

Currently

2

most time series work in psychology
employs the ARIMA models developed

by Box and Jenkins (1976) and Glass,
Willson and Gottman (1975).

How-

ever, recent work by Swaminathan
and Algina (1977), Algina and Swaminathan (1977) and Simonton (1977) have
applied the general linear model to
the time series.

Thus the purpose of part

I

will be to extend present

analytic procedures.
The purpose of part II is to explore the
efficacy of quasi-

experimental and -true" experimental explanation
in social science.
Experimental explanation seeks causes of observed
events.

For example,

Campbell (1963) remarks,
The present author accepts 'true'
experimentation as the optimal model
for the interpretation of change in
causal terms, (p. 213)

Similarly Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) remark.
Causal inferences, however, are the
main objective in the experimental
method, (p. 115)

Furthermore, the causal relationships are between events

.

events are operationalized objects, movements and behaviors.
are observed as "over there," or outside of us.

Roughly put,
Events

For example, a teacher

slapping the school principal is an event which we may wish to explain.
In contrast to the experimental explanation given by the appli-

cation of causal analysis to the occurrence of events, is a type of

explanation found in philosophy (Hampshire, 1959;

Winch, 1958), history

(Collingwood, 1956) and political science (Connolly, 1974;
1973).

Maclntyre,

Here the understanding of behavior requires an understanding

of actions;

actions are composed of thoughts (Collingwood, 1956), plans
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(Miller, Galanter and Pribraum,
1960), and rules (Winch, 1958;

Kovesi,

1967) such that the meaning of the action is
not obvious from the obser-

vation of movements.
The central thesis in part II is that
experimental demonstra-

tion of a causal relationship among "events"
in the sphere of human

movements (to put it crassly) is not sufficient
to compel us to accept
the explanation.

Embodied in the explanation are complex sets of

social relationships and shared perspectives
Connolly, 1974).

(Kuhn, 1962;

Pitkin, 1972;

It is the shared perspectives and relational "trusts"

that give an explanation its compelling force and not
its causal elegance.

Such a thesis shifts the basis of what is "true" and rational

from the logic of experimental analysis to shared social rules and
meanings.

To support this thesis an analysis of the term "independent

event" in experimental work and its analogue "action" in philosophy is

undertaken within the general framework of explanation, particularly
causal explanation.
In March of this year (1978) Israeli troops attacked PLO

positions in southern Lebanon along the Israeli border in response to a
terrorist attack on civilians near Tel Aviv.

Prime Minister Begin of

Israel explained that he wanted a secure buffer zone at the northern
Israeli border which would prevent future PLO penetrations into Israel.

President Sadat of Egypt argued that a secure border can only be achieved
through the recognition and acceptance of that border by all involved
parties.

For Sadat it was the relationships that were essential to

achieving a secure border not physical control.

In an analogous way

the understanding of a social scientific problem cannot be accomplished

4

by sheer external control (i.e.
experimental manipulation).

Explanation

in social science must embody a
series of trust relationships between
the

various participants and observers;

a causal demonstration of relation-

ships is not sufficient to adopt an
explanation (Harre and Secord, 1972).
The implication of part II is not
the abandonment of causal

thinking but rather the recognition that
causal thinking itself is bound

inextricably to thinkers and their context.

As such, our social

scientific concepts, methods and conclusions
arise out of a way of life
and thus must not be severed from these roots.
theme.

This is Winch's (1958)

In the largest, and currently popular frame,
part II is a

quest for roots.

Part

I

begins with a review of the origins and development of

time series work outside as well as within the field
of psychology.

This is followed by a detailed treatment of two
procedures

for the

analysis of single observation quasi-experimental time series designs.
Part

I

concludes with a section summarizing the requirements and circum-

stances which obtain in order to apply time series designs in research
settings.

Between part

I

and part II is a "buffer" chapter.

The purpose

of this chapter is to facilitate the transition from technical considera-

tions of a particular statistical design to philosophical considerations
of explanation in social science.

Part II begins with a review of the "covering law" model of

explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948;
"event" in social scientific explanation.

Dray, 1957) and the notion of

Collingwood (1956) provides

a basis for working out a distinction between "event" and "action".

5

Part II concludes by examining
the implications of a relational
or interactive perspective for social
scientific explanation.
The relational
perspective is derived from a consideration
of the notion of "action" in
contrast to "event" in the research
setting.

Finally the metaphor which unites
this divided thesis is
Ouroboros, an ancient Greek snake that
is eating its tail.
unnamed section

I

In an

have hidden, like "Nina" in a New Yorker
cartoon, the

explanation of how this metaphor is applied
in order to encourage the
reader to read on.

CHAPTER

II

BACKGROUND

Origins of Time Series Analysis
Time series analysis Is useful in several
scientific disciplines,

particularly economics and the managerial
sciences (Nelson, 1973;
and Jenkins, 1976).

Box

Recent works by Glass, Willson and Gottman
(1975).

and Hersen and Barlow (1976) have applied
statistical time series models
to research problems in psychology.

However, procedures for studying

data over time have existed for a long time;

Campbell (1963) points out

that time series methods were the classic designs
for 19th century physi-

cal sciences.

Moreover, statistical methods are relatively recent

developments in the analysis of time series.

Yule (1926) conceptualized

the series as a function of separate and independent
shocks.

His work in

analyzing the occurrence of sun spots during the 18th century is
one of
the earliest applications of the so called moving average models
which are

discussed later.

Perhaps the most steady development of these proce-

dures has been achieved in econometrics and business forecasting.
In economics and business the generic problem is forecasting.

Economic and managerial forecasting is studied in finance, marketing,
operations research, business economics, public administration and production.

Forecasting such quantities as quality of production require

that data be examined over time.

One of the earliest methods involved plotting averages on charts

(Shewhart, 1931).

Charting averages of some production quantity as a
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function of

tiine

provided a simple technique for
illustrating business

cycles, trends, and in general
the state of the company.

While charting techniques are
still practiced, more quantitatively sophisticated methods captured
the interest of academics and

more theoretically minded forecasting
managers.

The earliest quanti-

tative approaches applied the
correlational and regression work of

Pearson and others.

For example, Shewhart (1931) studied
quality

control processes.

One of the time series procedures involved
plot-

ting the production process as a
function of time.

The process was

assumed to be linear through time and a standard
error of measurement
was calculated.

This statistic was then used to form a confidence

band along the series.

A data point falling outside of this band was

indicative of a change in the behavior of the series,
possibly indicating trouble as illustrated in Figure 2.1.

50

40

•

Trouble

per cent
30

20
10

• -

0

•

•

N

D

Figure 2.1. Percentage of defects
(from Shewhart, 1931,

K

p. 413.)

•

•
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This is essentially a charting
technique that uses a few additional

statistics beyond the arithmetic mean.

Other early time series techniques may
be extracted from
textbooks on correlational analysis.

Ezekiel (1930) fits regression

curves to set off different bivariate
situations.

In one of these

situations the variable on the absissa is
time.

The statistics of

interest would be the correlation
coefficient (proportion of explained
variance)
,

regression coefficient (amount of change)
and the standard

error of estimate (the accuracy of estimate).

However, a major prob-

lem with these regression techniques is
created by the non-independence
of observations.

Early investigators tended to under-estimate
the

importance of this problem.

For example, Ezekiel (1930) remarked,

Although questions may be raised
as to how closely the prices in
successive months of a staple
commodity are really independent
of one another, there is no question but that conditions are constantly changing, so that there
are some elements of independence
between successive observations,
(p. 326)

While the biasing impact of serial dependency has been recognized for a
long time (Yule, 1926), it has only been recently that it has been dealt

with systematically (Brown, 1963;

Nelson, 1973;

Box and Jenkins, 1976

and Glass, Willson and Gottman, 1975).

Serial dependency may be analyzed by fitting a mathematical

model to the time series.

This fitting process results in an esti-

mate of the number of parameters and their numerical values
There are two basic types of mathematical models: deterministic

9

and stochastic (Box and
Jenkins. 1976)

.

A deterMnlstlc .odel Is
a

^.the^tlcal function that
Iso^^hlcally describes the relationship
between two variables.
dependent and

For exa^le, a trajectory
of a

he described with great
accuracy by a

^ssUe

Is

tl^

^the^tlcal

function.

Unfortunately, there is probably
no phenomenon that is com-

pletely deterministic including
the path of a missile.

Thus, we must
use a type of model that
specifies the probability of a future
value

lying between two specified limits.

Models that specify a probability

structure for the series of observations
are called stochastic models.
Ihis thesis deals with stochastic
models, specifically discrete stochastic models.

While the data may be measured on a
continuous scale, the

time series models are discrete.

It must be kept in mind that the

data is studied as a function of
discrete, equally spaced points in time.
That is, the operator, time, is discrete.

Box and Jenkins (1976) present three approaches
for analyzing
a time series: via the autocovariance
function, periodograms and the

spectral density function.
covariance function;

The main focus here will be on the auto-

the periodogram and the spectral density function

are briefly described.

Schuster (1898) developed the periodogram to detect and estimate the amplitude of a sine component of known frequency
buried in
noise.

More recently the periodogram has been used to check the random-

ness of a series of residuals (Box and Jenkins, 1976).

By relaxing

the assumption that the frequencies are harmonics of the
fundamental fre-

quency 1/N, the sample spectrum function may be defined.

This sample

10

spectrum is another way of analyzing
a

ti«

series by using sine or cosine

waves buried in noise.
The spectrum function and the
autocovariance function are
mathematically equivalent.
Thus, as Box and Jenkins
(1976) point out,
the advantages /disadvantages
of these functions are due to
their repre-

sentational values rather than their
mathematical properties.

Specifi-

cally, the spectrum indicates which
frequencies are present in the series

whereas the autocovariance function
shows how successive observations in
the series are related.

The autocovariance function is a central
concept to the general
class of discrete linear stochastic models
referred to as the ARIMA (auto-

regressive integrated moving average) models.

A particular ARIMA

model is identified by examining the autocovariance
function.

The ARIMA

models are widely used in psychology and thus
we will postpone a discussion of the autocovariance function until the
next section where we
discuss the development of time series analysis in
psychology.

Development of Time-Series Analysis in Psychology
Two major traditions within psychology have contributed signif-

icantly to the development of time series analysis and, ironically, the
two traditions are quite different in their methods of examining phenomena.

The earliest procedures came from the operant tradition which

emphasizes experimental control of responses of an individual organism
(Sidman, 1960).

While procedures that grew out of the second tradition

also studied individual cases, the tradition was tied to classical

statistical designs (Campbell and Stanley, 1963).

Consequently, the

11

latter procedures emphasize
statistical hypothesis testing as the
basis
of inference instead of
"eyeballing" the behavior of the series.

Hersen and Barlow (1976) provide an
excellent historical perspective on single case analysis in
operant research.
chapter is on single case designs not
time series

While their

£er se, it is fre-

quently the case that a single case
design is a time series.

That is,

the behavior of a single organism
or indicator is studied as a function

of time.

They also point out that early researchers
in psychology

such as Fechner, Wundt and Tichener focused
on individual cases.

Specifically they studied within subject variability
in an attempt to

discover general laws which would be applicable
across individuals.
These methods of investigating single cases in
order to discover "ideal"

response patterns which followed general laws became
known as structural
methods.

Eventually the methods of these structuralists were overshadowed by analyses of individual differences which required that
data
be aggregated over individuals.

General laws were sought by studying

group or average characteristics rather than the behavior of a single
organism.

Analysis of variance developed by

R.

A.

Fisher (see Fisher,

1935) in the 1920 's became the major analytical tool to experimentally

study group characteristics;

major analytical tool.

indeed analysis of variance became the

The methodological Zeitgeist through the 50 's

was group comparisons via statistical hypothesis testing and estimation.

Hersen and Barlow (1976) point out that there were very few papers during the 1950's defending the study of the single case (Beck, 1953;
Rosenzweig, 1951)

.

The notable exception to a group comparison

12

approach is the work of B. F. Skinner.
Before reviewing the operant time
series techniques, one other

related research method needs to be
mentioned.

This method grew out

of 19th century clinical practice
and became known as the case study

method.

Unlike operant techniques, the case
study approach is non-

experimental and formed the basis for much
of the psychotherapy research.
While case study research required careful
and detailed observations, it
did not adhere to the inferential requirements
of experimental work
(e.g., control groups and random sampling).

Consequently many

applied researchers sought other techniques.
Operant techniques were developed in the context of
the

ubiquitous analysis of variance and the requirements of
experimental
logic.

Sidman (1960) gives a comprehensive discussion of single
sub-

ject research.

He criticizes group comparisons and presents single

subject designs as experimentally sound alternatives to analysis of

variance techniques.

Of concern here are those operant designs which

examine behavior as a function of time.
The basic operant time series design consists of two phases:

baseline data

(A)

on the organism and data collected after the inter-

vention or experimental manipulation
illustrated in figure 2.2.

(B)

.

Several A-B patterns are

In this figure the absissa is time and the

ordinate is rate of behavior.
These diagrams illustrate various possible changes in slope
and level as a function of the experimental manipulation which is

represented by the dotted vertical line.
More complex operant designs involve reversal shifts which
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Figure 2.2

Patterns of data of A-B operant time-series
design (from Hersen and Barlow, 1976, p.280281).
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atten^t to negate the effect of
the manipulation and then
reinstitute the
treatment.
These A-B-A-B designs set up
the subject as its own control and permit broader
generalizations about the manipulation
over time.
At the most general level,
two approaches are used to
analyze
these designs:
the "eyeballing" approach and
the statistical approach.
The "eyeballing" approach
requires that the data show obvious
changes
over time and that these changes
coincide with the manipulation.
In

such Instances the eyeballed
inference is obvious and if it is not

obvious then the experiment did not
achieve sufficient control of the

variables (Sidman, 1960).

Within the statistical approach there
are

several alternatives which include
t-tests, analysis of variance,

stochastic models and general linear models.

While the subject of

this thesis deals with the statistical
approaches, particularly the

general linear models, not all researchers
endorse the statistical
approach.
In fact some writers in the operant literature
are adamantly

against any sort of statistical analysis of behavioral
data.

For

example, Michael (1974) makes this comment about
autoregressive models,
...their [autoregressive techniques]
understanding will surely require a good
deal of graduate instruction time and
their proper usage could easily become a
main concern from the point of view of
data analysis clearly a case of the
tail wagging the dog. (p. 652)

—

Part of Michael's objection to the use of statistical techniques concerns the substitution of statistical significance for significance

determined by expert judgment.

If the experimental variable were pro-

perly controlled then statistical significance would be trivial and
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expert judgments of significance
unequivocal.
However, sheer reliance on "eyeballing"
assumes that sufficient

experimental control may be obtained in
order to support such inferences.
In many situations it is not
possible to achieve this experimental
control.

Furthermore, statistical techniques are
grounded in probability

theory.

The application of probability theory
to statistical computa-

tion permits the researcher to determine
how "rare" or "common" an event
is.

Often the probabilities of various events
are not obvious and one

has to go beyond the "eyeballing" techniques
to find them.

Finally

good statistical practice does not rely on
statistical significance as

heavily as Michael (1974) implies.
The position here is that eyeballing is a reasonable
method
of analyzing time series data and should not be
neglected.

Most stan-

dard textbooks on data analysis recommend graphing time
series data
(Ezekiel, 1930;
et al.

,

1975).

Ezekiel and Fox, 1959;

Box and Jenkins, 1976;

Glass

Charting time-series data is an eyeballing technique.

However, the application of statistical models to time series data adds

analytical power which can go beyond the power of the unaided eye.
For example, it would be very difficult to identify a time series as

stationary in its second order differences.

In the following section

we review the alternatives within the statistical approach, pointing
out the shortcomings of some approaches (e.g., t-tests) and emphasizing

other approaches (e.g., ARIMA models and general linear model).

Analysis of Time-Series Data in Psychology
Early statistical approaches for analyzing time-series data
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have involved curve fitting
(Mood. 1950) and analysis
of varl.
.ance
(Shine and Bower, 1971;
Gentile. Roden and Klein.
1972).
The use of
t-tests are not appropriate
because, among other reasons,
they do not
take into account the behavior
of the data over time.
For example,
a t-test on graph
8 in figure 2.2 would not yield a
significant result
though the Intervention had
a clear effect.
On the other hand a ttest on graph 6 In figure
2.2 would yield a significant result
though
the Intervention had no Impact
on the growth curve.

Mood (1950) recommends fitting a
regression line to the pretreatment means, Oi - 0,.
time

This fitted curve Is then extrapolated
to

five where a confidence Interval Is
constructed around the pre-

dicted point.

If the observed mean, O5, falls
outside of the confi-

dence region then a treatment effect Is
Inferred.

However. Campbell

and Stanley (1963) point out that this
procedure would not be appropriate when a continuous Improvement Is
hypothesized.

They suggest that

the researcher compare the Intercepts and
slopes of the pre- and post-

treatment regression lines.

If the slopes and Intercepts are Identical

then It Is concluded that the treatment had no
effect.

As noted by

Mood (1950), Campbell and Stanley (1963), Swamlnathan
and Alglna (1977),
and Slmonton (1977), these procedures do not take Into
account the

dependence among the repeated observations In the series nor do they

handle observations that lie on a curve Instead of a straight line.
Shine and Bower (1971), and Gentile, Roden and Klein (1972)

develop analysis of variance procedures that may be used for single
subjects.

Gentile et al.

(1972) recommend a fixed-effect-one-way ANOVA

where trials within conditions (A-B-A-B) are considered replications.
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The error term Is calculated
from trials within the
collapsed A and B
cells.
These data are assumed to be
statistically independent and
normally distributed about the
treatment means.
The major difficulty with the
procedure recommended by Gentile et al.

(1972) is that the independence
assumption concerning the

data from trial to trial is not
tenable;
ally dependent.

trial data are usually seri-

A positively biased F-test results
from the arti-

ficially lower variability produced
by the non-independence of the
data.

Some writers (see Glass, Willson
and Gottman, 1975) have esti-

inated that a .3 serial
correlation may bias a .90 confidence
interval

by 20 percent.

Shine and Bower (1971) and Shine
(1973) recommend

specific tests of independence before
the ANOVA model is applied.
However, their recommendations do not
overcome the fact that trial

data are usually serially dependent.
In order to handle the serial dependency
in the data more

complicated stochastic models, such as the ARIMA
models, are required.

Box and Jenkins (1976) developed these discrete
linear stochastic models
and Glass, Willson and Gottman (1975) applied them
to research problems
in evaluation and psychology.

These models provide a function that

relates a given observation in the sequence to previous
observations.

Specifically, if
t=0,l,2

is a sequence of random variables measured at times

and e^ is the error associated with the variable

Z^.,

the

most general linear stochastic models, which expresses the relationship
of Z^ to its predecessors, can be written as
[2.1]

f(B)V^Z^ = g(B)e^,
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where B and V are linear operators
such that

and the functions f(B) and g(B)
are defined as
f(B) =

1-((.,B-(}>2B^

- ...

bP

-4,

P

g(B) = l-0iB-02B^ - ... -0
q

Equation [2.1] represents an autoregressive
integrated moving average
(ARIMA) model of order
(p, d, q)

,

where the nominal parameter
p

refers to the autoregressive terms, d to
the degree of differencing

necessary to make the series stationary, and

q to the

moving average

terms
One of the simplest models, ARIMA
(1, 0, 0) is written,
12. 2]

= <|)iZ^_^ +

e^..

This model is similar in form to a regression model
with one independent

variable.

In the case here the observation at time

t

is a function of

the immediately preceding observation.
In order to determine which of the specific ARIMA models apply,
the autocorrelation function from the data is plotted in a
correlogram.

Each model [e.g.: (1, 0, 0);

(0, 0,

1);

(0,

1,

different form for the autocorrelation function.

correlation function for ARIMA (1, 0,

whereas for ARIMA (0, 0,

1)

0)

1);

etc.] implies a

For example, the auto-

decays exponentially across lags

it drops to zero after lag one.

Lag refers

to the "distance" back in the series that the observation at time

paired with.

t

A lag one autocorrelation is the correlation between

is
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Z^_^;

a lag two autocorrelation
Is the correlation between
Z

^e

and

autocorrelation function is the
plot of the autocorreLtions

across lags.
The model in equation
[2.2] may be expanded to
include an
intervention parameter.
A simple transformation applied
recursively
to [2.2] removes the error
dependency due to the presence
of

^.

The

recursive transformation results
in a linear model that may
be^^timated
using least squares and maximum
likelihood procedures.

While the ARIMA models have a
broad range of applicability,
they have two

major drawbacks.

First, in order to get a stable
esti-

mate of the autocorrelation
function at least 50 and preferably
100

observations are required.

Second, the approach is essentially
a two-

stage procedure which requires the
estimation of the parameters in the
ARIMA model, and then treating these
estimated parameters as known quantities in order to estimate the effect
of the intervention (Glass et al.
1975, p. 85 and p. 158).

The bias introduced in the estimates of
the

intervention effects when the estimates of the
parameters of the stochastic model are treated as constants is not
known and needs to be

investigated.

This second point is expanded in Chapter IV.

A second approach developed by Simonton (1977), Swaminathan
and Algina (1977), Algina and Swaminathan
(1977) within the framework of
the general linear model avoids these problems.

Simonton (1977) dis-

cussed a procedure for comparing fitted straight lines
through the preand post-treatment set of points under the assumption
that the observations follow a first-order auto-regressive scheme.

On the other hand.
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the procedure outlined by Swaminathan
and Algina (1977) involves a com-

parison of the regression curves fitted
to the pre- and post-treatinent
set of observations.

These authors have shown that under
general con-

ditions, i.e., that the variance -co variance
matrix of the observations
is unrestricted,

the test statistic has an exact F
distribution.

The procedures presented in Swaminathan
and Algina (1977)

assume that the pre-treatment and the
post-treatment regression curves
are polynomials of degree r-1, i.e., for the
pre-treatment observation

vector xl = [xiX2

...

[2.3]

Xl = Pi3i

+

X2 = P262

+ 62

x^] and for the post- treatment observation
vector

e^i,

where 81 and 62 are the (rxl) vectors of pre-treatment and
post-treat-

ment regression weights, and ei and 62 are the error vectors.
observations are made at times

ti

,

t2

....

t

If the

^ , the elements pi
p+q
ij

and P2^j of the (pxr) and (qxr) matrices
pi and P2 respectively are

defined as
p,.. = t^
^lii

i = 1,

.

.

.

.

,

p;

? t|, i = p=l,

.

.

.

.

,

j

* 0, 1,

...

,

r - 1

and

f2-6]

p2jLj

q;

j

= 0, 1,

.

.

.

.,

r-1.

The treatment effect is defined in terms of the regression weights, i.e
if
[2.7]

ii = 32
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then it can be concluded that the
regression curves are identical and

hence that there is no evidence of
a treatment effect.
Before the regression coefficients may
be estimated and
tested, the adequacy of the polynomial
representation must be established.

The establishment of the degree of the
polynomial represen-

tation in itself may permit an inference
about a treatment effect in
some areas.

That is, by definition, a treatment effect
would be

inferred if the pre-treatment and posttreatment curves are of different degrees.

Swaminathan and Algina (1977) provide a procedure
for

determining the degree of the pre-treatment and
post-treatment curves.
However, as pointed out by the above authors, a
problem

arises if either the number of pre-treatment
observations p, or the

number of post-treatment observations q, is less than

r - 1.

For

example, if the degree of the polynomial that fits the
post-treatment
set of observations is four and if the number of
pre-treatment obser-

vations is four, then, since a curve of at most degree three can
be
made to fit the pre-treatment set of points, a treatment effect may
be

erroneously inferred.

Swaminathan and Algina (1977) point out that

this difficulty may be overcome by constructing a confidence band for
the curve (pre or post) that has the larger number of observations.

This confidence band is then extended to the other set of observations
in order to see if the means for this second set lie within the confi-

dence band.

However, as these authors also point out, their procedure

is not entirely adequate since the constructed confidence band is valid

only for the section of the curve for which it was constructed and not
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for the extrapolated points.

Swaminathan , Coulson and Algina
(1977)

have developed a procedure that
overcoines these difficulties.

This is

accomplished by comparing the degree
of the entire curve to that of
the
pre- or post-treatment curve
(whichever has more points) instead
of
comparing the pre-treatment curve with
the post- treatment curve.

The

added advantage is that the comparison
recommended here results in a

simpler procedure than the one given
by Swaminathan and Algina (1977),

when the exact form of the regression
curve is not important.
procedure is presented in Chapter III.

This

CHAPTER

III

Inferring Treatment Effects in Time
Series Designs
Procedure One

Introduction
The procedure described in this
chapter was developed as an

alternative to constructing confidence
intervals when the number of pretreatment (p) or post- treatment
(q) observations is less than the degree
of the polynomial (r-1) fitted to these
curves.

As was pointed out in

Chapter II a polynomial of, for example, degree
four may fit the posttreatment curve.

If there are only four pre- treatment
data points then

the highest degree polynomial that could fit
these four points would be
three.

In these circumstances a treatment effect would
be inferred

because the pre-treatment and post- treatment curves would
be polynomials
of different orders.

However, the inference may not be due to the treat-

ment because the difference in the order of the polynomials may
be due to
the fact that the number of observations for one of the curves
is less

than the order of the appropriate polynomial.

Swaminathan and Algina (1977) recommend constructing a confidence band for the curve with the larger number of points.

The confidence

band is then extended into the region of the other curve in order to see
if the means for this second set lie within the confidence band.

tunately the inference in this case is based on extrapolation and
23

Unfor-
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therefore may be inappropriate.
The procedure developed In
this chapter avoids these
difficulties.

Specifically, the degree of the
entire curve Is compared to the
degree of the pre- or
post-treatment curve (whichever has
more points)
instead of comparing the
pre-treatment curve with the
post-treatment
curve.
The procedure described here
is easier to use than the
one

given by Swaminathan and Alglna
(1977).

Because this procedure does

not test the exact form of the
curves (i.e.,

= B,)

,

it Is only appro-

priate when the exact form of the
regression curve is not of Interest.

Procedure
The procedure is based on the result
that if r-1 is the same

for the curve of the pre-treatment
(or post-treatment) data points and
the curve of all the data points
(pre and post), then the curves are

identical.

In order to see this, let the pre- (or
post-) treatment

curve be given by
f^-lJ

y = a

+

ai

X + a2 x2 + ... + a

v

and the entire curve be given by
r3.2]

y'

= b

o

+ bi X

+ b2
'-

x2

+

Let x^ be a point common to both curves.

...

+

b

,

r-l

x'^"^

In this case we know that v
o

y'^ because the total curve includes the pre- (or post-) treatment curve
Then from [3.1] and [3.2] we have
[3.3]

y^ - y'^ = 0 = (a^ - b^) + (ai - bj) x^ + (a2 - b2) x^^

^

^Vl

-

\-l> -o"'
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Since equation [3.3] is identically
equal to zero for all values of
x^,
Thus, if the degree of the
= b^.
pre- (or post) treatment curve
equal to the degree of the
curve that passes through all the
points, the
curves must be identical.

L

In order to infer a treatment
effect we tested the hypothesis

that the degree of the curve
that fits the pre-treatment (or
post-

treatment) set of means is the same
as the degree of the curve that
fits
the entire set of means.

This hypothesis can be conveniently
stated

as two sets of hypotheses:
1.

a (r-l)th degree polynomial fits the
pre-treatment or post-

treatment set of observations, whichever
set has more observations
2.

.

a (r-l)th degree polynomial fits the entire
set of points.

If both of these hypotheses are accepted
then we can conclude that the

pre-treatment and post- treatment regression curves are
of the same degree,

which in turn implies that the two regression curves
are identical.
Thus, acceptance of the hypotheses above implies
that the treatment was

not effective, while the rejection of one of them
(i.e., the hypothesis
on the pre- or post- treatment curve) implies that the
treatment was

effective.

However, if it happens that both hypotheses are rejected,

then it has to be taken that the polynomial representation is
not adequate.

In this case,

(r-1) is incremented by one, and the hypotheses

tested again.
In general, the hypothesis that a curve of degree (r-1) fits a

set of means where the means are obtained on the same group of individuals,
can be stated as

26
[3.4]

C

where

= —
0

y

m —m

is a (mxl) vector of .eans

stants.

,

and

is a (.-rx.) .atrix of con-

For instance, C matrix appropriate
to testing the hypothesis

that a curve of degree two fits
a set of six means, is

'6

1-3 3-1 0
1-3 3-1
0

-

0

0

1-3

0
0

3-1

If the degree of the polynomial
is r-1, then C_ is defined as
m
[3.5]

a_

o^

o

a

.

o

.

a_

m

£
where the elements of the

.

.

(lxr4-l)

.

vector a are the coefficients in the

expansion of (1-x)^.
The appropriate statistic for testing the hypothesis given
by

Equation

4

under the assumption of multivariate normality and indepen-

dence of the vectors xi •••2^^'

known (Morrison, 1967, pp.120),

and is given by
[3.6]

where

T

_X^ is

m

2 =

n X'

—

Cm

(C S

m m

Cm

X
m—

)

,

the mean vector, and the sample dispersion matrix

by
[3.7]
= (n-1)"^

E

k=l

(X,

- X

)

(X,

-

X

)•

is given
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It is well known that when

given by [3.4] Is true, the
quan-

tity

t3.8]

= {(m-r)

(n-1)

}

{n -(m-r)

}

T

2

m

has the F distribution with degrees
of freedom (m-r) and n-(m-r).
In order to test the hypothesis
that a curve of degree (r-1)

fits the pre- treatment or the
post- treatment means, we take m =
p or q,

whichever is larger.

In order to test the hypothesis
that a curve of

degree (r-1) fits the entire set of
points, we take m = p+q.

The test

statistic for each of these values of m
can be obtained readily from
Equations 3.6 and 3.8.
The initial choice of the degree of the
polynomial, r-1, is

arbitrary.

Its value may be guessed by plotting
the means, or other-

wise, it is set equal to one and incremented
until the fit is deemed

adequate
Example
The multivariate data generated by Swaminathan and
Algina
(1977) to simulate nine pre-treatment observations and six
post-treatment

observations on N=40 subjects are reanalyzed using the procedure
outlined
here.
,

The pre-treatment mean vector Xi and post- treatment mean vector

are given below
Xi = [19.8

.29.9

38.1

43.4

48.1

50.0

X2 = [52.3

52.5

53.1

54.1

57.5

61.0]

51.8

52.1

52.4]

The (15x15) sample variance-covariance matrix of the entire set of obser-

vation is not reported for lack of space and may be obtained from the
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authors on request.

Polynomials of different degrees,
starting with r=l were
fitted for the pre-treat.ent
of pre/post (total)
treatment means
until degrees of the polynomials
were determined. The results
of the
analysis are given In Table
3.1.
The results show that curves
of
degree three adequately describe
the pre-treatment set of
observations

Table 3.1

Analysis of Quasi-experimental
Time-series Data
p=9 q=6 N=40

t2

IZILIL

"^'i^^''^^-'

Tr-ZIT .
Treatment

1
2
3

4677.38

^^-Srees of Preedom
Total,
Curve
-r

Treatment
Total
Curve
Curve
p-r,n-(p-r) (p+q,n-(p+q-r)

Pre
Treatment
Curve

Total
Curve

5727.39

7,

33

13,

27

565.40

305.01

108.03

3129.17

6,

34

12.

28

15.70

187.22

10.08

17.57

5,

35

11.

29

1.81

1.19

and the entire set of observations.

We thus conclude that the pre-

and post-treatment regression curves are
identical and hence infer that
the treatment was not effective.

CHAPTER

IV

Analysis of Single Observation
Quasi-experimental
Time Series Designs

Procedure Two

Introduction
In this chapter a method is
presented for analyzing single

observation time series data.

With the exception of Glass.
Willson

and Gottman (1975). recent work
done on time series analysis require
that the number of subjects exceed
the total number of time points.

For example. Algina and Swaminathan
(1977) and Swaminathan and

Algina (1977) have outlined procedures
which take into account the nonindependence of the observations, and are
formulated to facilitate the
comparison of pre- treatment and post-treatment
regression curves.

If

these curves are identical, i.e.. if the
pre-treatment and post-treatment

sets of regression coefficients are equal,
then the hypothesis of a

treatment effect is not tenable.

Simonton (1977) outlined a similar

procedure for comparing the pre- and post-treatment
regression curves

when they are straight lines and when the errors
follow a first order
autoregressive scheme.

While these procedures employ well known results

from multivariate statistics, they require more subjects
than time points.
Glass, et. al.

(1975) have applied the ARIMA models (see Box

and Jenkins. 1976) to the analysis of psychological and
educational time

series data.

These models are appropriate for single subject time series

or in general when the number of time points exceeds the number of
29

30

subjects.

However, these procedures have several
drawbacks which stem

from a two stage estimation procedure.

Specifically, after a particu-

lar ARIMA model Is Identified, say
first order autoregresslve , the

parameters of this Identified model are
estimated through a maximum like-

lihood estimation procedure.

In the second stage these estimated

parameters are treated as constants in order to
estimate a second set of
parameters associated with the level of the series
tion effect (6).

(L)

and the interven-

By treating the first set of estimated parameters
as

constants the effect of sampling errors are ignored.

Unfortunately

these sampling fluctuations introduce an unknown
amount of bias into the

second set of estimates.

As a consequence of this unspecified bias

created by the two stage estimation procedure, several difficulties
arise.

For example, the distribution of b in the model that contains

the level and intervention parameters (L, 6] will not be multivariate

normal.

These difficulties are discussed in more detail at the end of

this chapter.
In the model presented below a simultaneous test for serial

correlation and polynomial trend is developed.

This simultaneous test-

ing procedure gives estimates in a single stage and thereby avoids the

concomitant problems of the two-stage procedure associated with the ARIMA
models.

Furthermore this model also may be used for the analysis of

single observation time series designs.

Initially the model is devel-

oped for a first order autoregresslon scheme and a linear trend in the
series.

Subsequently the model is extended to include higher order

autoregresslon schemes and polynomial trends.
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The Model
The single unit (subject,
group, etc.) time series design
with
P pre-treat.ent observations and
q post- treatment observations made at

times

ti,t9,...tt
^
^

P

«.

represented as

p+q*

P+1*

Zl, 22,

!
...» 2^
P

Z

I

p+1

where the division in the series
between
experimental manipulation.

....z ^ ,
p+q

and z^^^ represents an

We shall assume that the
pre-treatment and

post-treatment observations lie on straight
lines, i.e..
[A. la]

«

z

^01

+ 3ii t^ + e^. n =

e02

+ ei2

1,

p

and

[A. lb]

The regression coefficients,
3oi and

+ e^, n = p+1,

Bnare

p+q.

the intercept and slope

parameters for the pre-treatment regression line
while the coefficients,
eo2 and $12, correspond to the post-treatment regression
line.

Follow-

ing Algina and Swaminathan (1977), Simonton
(1977). and Swaminathan and

Algina (1977), we define a treatment effect in terms of
the regression
coefficients.

[A. 2]

If

H

^01

302

3ii

3i2

:

o

is accepted, then it can be assumed that the hypothesis of a treatment

effect is not tenable.
The procedure for estimating the parameters in the model [A.l]
as outlined by Swaminathan and Algina (1977) is clearly not valid since

,
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there is only one observation
per time point.
(1977) and Glass et. al.

Following Simonton

(1975), we assume that the errors,
e^

serially dependent according
to a first-order auto-regressive scheme, i.e.
[A. 3]

e_ = pe

n-1

+

e

n

with |p|<l to ensure stationarity
(see Appendix A and Glass et.
al.
1975, for a discussion).

The quantities

are disturbances that are

independently and identically distributed
with mean 0 and variance a^.
If we further assume that

is normal, an assumption that
is necessary

for testing hypotheses, and that
e

H

are independent of

e

J.

,

then it

can be shown that
[4.4]

e^^

where a

/(l-p^).

-

n [0, a2].

Furthermore it is well known (see Appendix A

for details) that the covariance between e

and

n+k, E(e^

^n+k^

'

by

Thus, the variance-covariance matrix, Z, of the vector
of errors,
=

[ei

,

e2

,

.

.

.

,

e

,

...

e
'p+q] is given

by

[4.5]
1

p

p^

.

.

.

p

1

p

.

.

.

P

1

.

.

.

given

;
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In order to facilitate
further development. „e need
the following result,

given by Ogawara (1953) and
Krlshnalah and Murthy (1966)

Let (x^) be a sequence of
normally distributed random
variables such that

I!!eorea:

where

such that
E(e^) = 0,

and

Then, the conditional random variables
{x2jx2^_^, x ^^^}, are independ-

ently and identically normally distributed
with mean
[4.6]

E(x,Jxa„.^, x,„,,)

where y = 2p/(l+p2)^

- l(p,^_^

. P3_^^p ^

lu^^^ ^

variance

f^-^^

''2^,''2^.V

Proof:

=

%+l

= <^^(l-P^)/(l+p2) = a*2

The independence of x^Jx^^,^, x^^^^ and
^z^,^]^!^,^ ^2^_^

follows immediately since it is well known that

xo

pendent if X2^_^ is held constant (Morrison, 1976,
derive [4.6] and [4.7], let

n

and xo
p. 138).

^

are indeIn order to

,

,
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and

a2

The eleioents of

Z

a2p2

^21^22

follow directly from the results given
in Appendix A.

For example, entry a^p^ is the
covariance of X2^_^ and
Xi^^y

observations are two lags apart.

These

Similarly the entry in row one,

column three is the covariance of

and X^^,^^.

These observations

are adjacent and thus the lag is one
and the covariance is a2p.

Since
X
it follows

N

(j£,E)

(See Anderson, 1958, p.

E(x2^|x2) =

28)

that

+ (X2 - y2)222 ^12

Now
=^P/(1+P^)}

Z"^ a 12
22

[1

1]

Hence

E(X2JX2) =

+ {p/(l+p2)} {(X2^_^ - I

n

2

y2^.i)

^^2n-l + %-Hi)

^2„-r ^2^+1

=

-2-12

^22

(X2

" y2

(^2^-1^^2^+l>-

Similarly, it follows that

"^2n-

+

%2

= a2(l-p2)/(i+p2) =

.

J)
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In order to apply the above
theorem to estimate the parameters

in the model given by Equations
[4.1a] and 14.1b], we write

^

- POI + eiit^.

n - 1, .... p,

\

- 3o2

n = p+1,

+ 6l2tj^.

p+q.

Then, since

+ e*

n,

it follows that for the pre-treatment set
of observations,
[4.8]

"2nl"2„-r ^2^+1

= eoi

en

(1-Y) +

[t^^ -

^

(t^^_^ + t^^^^)]

and, for the post-treatment observations,
14.9]

^^n\^^n-V ^2^+1

- Bo2(l-Y)

-f

3i2

2

where ^e*^}

,

[t2^ -

^n-1

\

(t^^,^ + t,^^^)]

^n+1

are independently and identically distributed.

2ji»

If we fur-

ther assune that observations are made at equally spaced time points, and
set

aoi = 3oi (1-y)
cil • 3li (1-y)

ao2 • 3q2 (1-y)
"12 " 3i2 (1-y)
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and

n

2

^n-1

^^^j^-'

,

the models given by [4.8]
and [4.9] reduce to

[4.10a]

% %-l;

^2^+1 ' ^01 + 0'll(2n) + Yz^ + e*2^,

for the pre-treatment observations,
and
[4.10b]
^^n ^2n_i. Z2n+;L "

+ ai2(2n) + Yz' + e*2

°'02

n

•^n

,

for the post-treatment observations.
The model given by [4.1] is thus
expressible as a conditional

model given by Equation [4.10], with the
important property that the
errors, ej^, are independently and
identically distributed.

Dropping the notation for the conditional model,
the models
given by [4.10] can be combined to yield the
model
[^.11]

*

,

Nxl

Nx5

5x1

Nxl

where, if p is odd and q is even,
2'

=

[Z2,

Zp_^

Zp^^,

Zp^^_J,

[

a'

=

«*i
e
.

[cqi
*
[ea
r

ail
*

ot02

... e

V],

"12

*

^.^

I

|

a

*
.

.

*
,
e ^^^.^J

.
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12
14

1

0

0

(2i+z3)/2

0

0

(23+Z5)/2

p-1 0

0

(z

.+z )/2
p-2 Tp"

0

0

1

p+1 (z +z _^„)/2
P P+2

0

0

1

p+3

0

0

1

p+q-1 (z

p+q-2

+z ^ )/2
p+q

and N, the number of observations, is (p+q-1) /2.
By definition,
E(e*)

=

0,

and

E(e* e*l)

where

I

is the identity matrix.

=

a*2

I

Since the elements, e*^, are indepen-

dently and identically distributed, the vector a can be estimated by the
usual ordinary least squares procedure (Searle, 1971).
of

The estimate a

is given by

[4.12]

a = (X'X)"-'-X'

Furthermore, it is well known that if e*

N(0^,

I), then
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14.13]

a

(X'X) ''].

Nia,

Tests of Hypotheses
The hypothesis of no treatment
effect given by Equation
[4.2],
H

:

POl

^02

3ii

3i2

o

can be stated In terms of the
elements of a as
°'01

H

[4.14]

:

o

an

This hypothesis together with other
hypotheses of Interest may be stated
In general as
[4.15]

H

where C Is full rank.

=0

a

:

o

rx5

5x1

For testing the hypothesis given by
[4.15], C is

chosen as

10-100

[4.16]
C =

0

1

Similarly, the hypothesis, H^:

p

0-10
= 0, that no serial dependence among

the observations exist, can be tested as H^:

y = 0.

The appropriate

choice of C in this case is
[4.17]

C =

[0

0

0

0

1].

The test statistic for testing the hypothesis given by [4.15]
is
[4.18]

F=

(N-5)

{a'C

[C(X'X)~-'-C']

^

Ca}/r

" a'X'^}
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and has the F-dlstrlbutlon with
r and (N-5) degrees of
freedom.

Thus,
the hypothesis, given by
[4.15] can be accepted or rejected
by cohering
the F value with the percentile
points of the appropriate F-dlstrlbutlon.

Once the hypothesis given by
[4.15] Is rejected. It may be of

interest to determine If there was a
change due to the Intercept, slope,
or both.
In order to determine this, (l-a)%
confidence Intervals can
be constructed for paraiKtrlc functions
of Interest.

In general. If

the hypothesis

H
is rejected,

Ca = —
0

—

:

o

(l-a)% limits for the simultaneous confidence
intervals of

the parametric functions a'Cb are given by
[^•19]

—a'Cb +

{rs2 F

}i

r,N-5;a

where

s2 =

(^.^ _ a'X'x)/(N-5).

Tests of Underlying Assumptions

An assumption that was made in developing the statistic for
testing the hypothesis of no treatment effect is that the serial depend-

ency of the observations remains the same before and after the treatment.
This assumption was made by Glass et al.

(1975) and Simonton (1977).

However, it is of interest to determine if this is indeed so, since a
test of treatment effect may not be meaningful if this condition is not
met.
In order to incorporate different autoregressive error schemes,

the model for error given by Equation [4.3] has to be modified as
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[4. 20a]

e

= qI

e

= p2 e

and
[4.20b]

+

n -

.

n+i

In applying the result
given by E,uatlon [A.6] to the
pre-treat^nt and

post-treatn^nt observations separately.
Equations [4.10a] and [4.10bl
become
[4.21a]

^2^|Z2„_i,

z

= aoi +

aH(2n) + Y^z' + e*2^
^

for the pre- treatment observations,
and
[4.21b]
,

^2nl^2j,-l' ^2^+1 =

°'02

+ ai2(2n) + Y2Z: + 6

for the post- treatment observations,
with
Yi

= 2pi/(l +
pf)

^2

= 2p2/(l + P2^

and

.

Moreover,

and

^<^2n,2

>

= 0> E<-2n,2) =

^-P^) /d+P^) =

where

and
n = p+1,

...» p+q.

*
2

,
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Thus, the hypothesis that
serial dependencies in the observa-

tions remain the

saine

can be tested by testing the
hypotheses:

[A. 22]

H

a2
11

:

o

22

and
[4.23]

H

y-

:

In order to test these hypotheses,
the linear model [4.11] is

rewritten as:
[4.24]

*

Xi

22

Q

*

«2

L

where

[«01

an

[ao;

ai2

J

^i]

J

L.

,

[4.25]
[Z2

±1
Ixi(p-l)
zi

=

[2

Ixi(q-l)

p+2

V4***

'

and
1

2

(21+ 23)72

1

4

(23+25)72

Xi

i(q-l)x3

i(p-l)x3

1 p-1

(2

,+z^)72

1

P*1-l<Vq-2*%+,'/'

,,
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It Should be pointed
out th.t the vectors of
observations,

"

and z,.ln Equation
[4.25] are arranged differently
than In Equation
[4.11].
Since It is not assu^d
that the sa»e serial
dependencies
exist within the pre-treatment
and post-treat„ent observations,
the
observation, z^^^,
not alloyed as the first
observation In the set
of POst-treat.ent observations.
This Is because. It cannot
be assumed
that Zp^^ is predictable
from z^, a pre-treafnent
observation.
This
difficulty is avoided If the first
observation used Is z^^^. which
Is
predictable from z^^^ and z^^j,
both belonging to the post-treatment
set
of observations.

u

Since,
e*i

'v>

N (0 ,

I)

and

e*2 ^ N (0

I)

,

i.e., the elements of the vector e *. =
[e?' e|'
'

tributed, the regression vectors,
ately.

and

are not identically dis-

have to be estimated separ-

However, before the vectors are estimated, the
hypothesis

V
is tested.

,

]

^ii =

i2

Since the estimates of

and a^^, s^^ and s^^, respective-

ly, are

^11 =

-

Xl(XlXiX"^Xi]zi}/(£^

- 3),

=

[I -

^(^x2^~\]z^}/(^

- 3),

and

43
it follows that sa^(p-7)/2
and sl^i^-n /Z are Independently
distributed
as chl-8,uare variates
with (p-7)/2 and (q-7/2 degrees
of freedom, re-

spectively.

Hence, the statistic for testing
the hypothesis

[4.26]

H

against

Hi

:

22
Is

F= sys^^

.

If the hypothesis, H^:

F(p.7)/2,(q-7)/2

=

is accepted,

assumed that the elements of the vector e* =
[e*ie*2
distributed.

]

However, this does not imply that
pj =

test this hypothesis, or, H^:

•

then it can be

are identically
In order to

when

= a^^ = a*2, we write

where z, X, and a are defined as previously.

Since, under the assump-

=

the model given by [4.24] as

z^'Xa

tions that

*

+ e

^22 ' ^^*»
e* ^ N (0,

a2* I),

it follows that

[4.27]
£1

(X{Xi)"^Xi

zi

a2

(X2X2)

Z2

X2

,
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and the estimate s*2 of a*2 ig
g^^^^
[4.28]
s

*2

=

-1
[I - X(X'X)--^X']z/

z'

[^(p+q-2) - 6]

The hypothesis
[4.29]

H

yl = Y2

:

o

can be stated as

H

C

:

o

a
—

=

0
—

[0

0

1

where

C

=

0

0

-1].

The statistic for testing the hypothesis
in [4.29] is
[4.30]
F = {a'C'[C(X'X)-lc']"^C a}/s*2

Fj,

^

,
Cp+q-2)-o

.

If this hypothesis is accepted, then we can
conclude that the serial

dependencies in the observations remain the same before and
after the
treatment.

Inferring Treatme nt Effects in the Presence of Polynomial Trends
The procedures outlined in the previous sections are valid

when the pre-treatment and post-treatment regression curves are straight
lines.

This requirement may be unduly restrictive at times and hence

procedures that take into account polynomial trends are necessary.

Assuming that observations made at time points, tj, t2
t

4._

lie on a curve of degree k, the observations

be represented as

z

n

made at time

t

n

can

,
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[4.31a]
"

-

* '"'n^^^'^ ^

and

^

^1^' +

e^. n = 1,

.

.

.

p,

[4.31b]

where, as before, we shall
assiaae that
'

Vl

"

+ ^n*

» - 1

P+q

This assumption, that the
serial dependence In the observations
regains
unchanged from pre-treatment to
post-treatment, can be tested as Indlcated in the previous section.
The results

Equation [4.31].

[4.6] and [4.7] cannot be directly
applied to

However, the model given in [4.31] can
be reduced to

the model given in [4.1] by taking
successive differences.
It is well known that if p(t) is
a polynomial of degree k,

then
[4.32]

k-1
A

, ,
=
p(t)

i.e., linear in t.

£

o

+

ji

t,'

1

It follows then that

k-1
[4.33a]

A^-^

^H^nn

— l^,
z^ =
Sim

^ = ^>

P»

and
[4.33b]
A

= £o2 + 5'12t^ +

^e^, n = p+1,

It also follows that if

e

n

= pe

,

n-1

+

e

n

,

then

n

n-1

n

p+q
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since A

k-1

is a linear operator.

Thus, the

difference. A^"^

follows the first-order autoregressive
scheme if e^ follows a firstorder autoregressive scheme.
Replacing A^"^ z by y
and A^'^ e by
<5„, we have
n
.

[4.34a]

^n

' ^01 + ^11

6^,

= ^02 + ^12

+6^.

n » 1,

p.

and
[4.34b]

n = p+1,

p+q.

with
1^-35]

6

n

= p6

,

n-1

+ e*

n

.

Thus, the model given by Equation
[4.32], is equivalent to the model given

by Equation [4.10] when the observations are
assumed to be made at equal
intervals, i.e., t^ = n.

The procedures outlined in the previous section

are, thus, immediately applicable to the situation
where a polynomial

trend is exhibited.

Test for Treatment Effect in the Presence of a hth Order Autoregressive
~
Scheme .

—

"

The procedure described in the previous sections can be directly extended to the case where, the error e

n

in the model [4.1] follows a

,

hth order autoregressive scheme, i.e.,
[4.36]

e

n

= Oi e
^

n-i

+ 02^ e
+
n-z

...

In this case, the autocorrelation function

+ 0

p^^

h

e

,

n-h

+

e

n

.

satisfies the Yule-Walker

equations (Kendall and Stuart, 1968)
1^-37]

+

01

p^_^ + ... + 0^p^_^ = 0, i=l, 2,

0.^ 0,

.
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with the requirement that
the roots of the equation
[4.38]
h

h-1

+...+0^=0
h

lie within the unit circle,
to ensure stationarity

As With first order
autoregressive scheme, it is
well known
that, in the sequence {e^}

,

the correlation between e^_^
and e^^^ par-

tialling out the effect of the
intermediate observations is zer^
Thus, e^ is predictable from
only the 2h adjacent response
and hence,
the sequence of conditional
random variables

^^n'Vh*

^n+h^

2(h+l), 3(h+l)...

=

are independently and identically
distributed.
It can be shown that (Ogawara,
1953;

Krishnaiah and Murthy,

1966)if t^ = n, then, for the pre-treatment
observations,
Zp. with the error following a kth
order autoregressive scheme.

I4.39aJ

M^l)

= "01 ^

annCh^l) .

^®n(h+l)'

\(z^(,,,)., .

n = 1,

^n(h.l).i>/2

p/(h+l).

Similarly, for the post-treatment observations,
[4.39b]

riCh+l)

12

®*n(h+l)'

i' n(h+l)-i ^ ^n(h+l)+i^/^

n = P+1.

(q-k)/(h+l).

The symbols z^^^^^) denotes the conditional nature of the
observations.

The parameter Y^, (i=l, ... h) in the model [4.39] are functions
of the
h parameters, Gj

,

02,

0^^

in the model [4.36].
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The model given by
Equation [4.37] can be
expressed in
matrix form

th(

[A. 40]

Nxl

Nx(h+4)

(h+4)xl

Nxl

where
N = (p+q-h)/(h+l),
and

^hl-

Thus, hypothesis concernine
ning the effect
eff^.r>^ r.f
of the treatment can
be stated as

°'

2x(h+4)

~

-

0

0

•••

0

-1

0

•••

0

(h+4)xl

where

10-1
C =
0

1

0

and tested as indicated in
the previous sections.

concerning Gj,

0^, ...

0

Similarly hypotheses

can be tested in terms of
y.,

'.•

v

Example
In order to test procedure two,
a linear model without trend

(slope equal to zero) was applied
to dat a generated to meet the
require-

ments of this model.

[4.41a]

The model is given by.

^2n =

^1+^2;

+ e*

2n

for the pre-treatment series and

[4.41b]

= «02 + Y

for the post-treatment series.

+ e*^
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As before,
O'Ol

=

°'02

=

Y

= 2p/(l+p2)

n

Bjj^

(1-Y)
(1-Y)

^

^

2n-l ^ '^2n+l^-

Equation [4.41] is simpler to work
with than the model given
by Equation [4.10] and, in essence,
is identical to the models
employed by Box and Jenkins (1976),
and Glass et al.

(1975).

In this

case, the treatment effect is
given by 6,, - 6^^, while the hypothesis
of no treatment effect is tested
by testing the hypothesis

°

01

02

Two first order autoregressive series
were generated from
a random numbers table

[X

and for the second series

'v.

p

N (0, 1)].
= -.6.

For the first series

p

= +.6,

Each series was approximately 80

observations in length, which resulted in 40
conditioned observations,
20 for the pre-treatment series and 20 for the
post-treatment series.

In order to determine if the procedure would
detect group

effects four SPSS regression analyses were carried
out.
(p =

.6 or p = -.6)

alized series.

compared agi and

Two analyses

for the generated condition-

In the remaining two analyses each observation in the

post- treatment series was incremented by two to simulate a
treatment
effect, and the hypothesis, H^: a^^ = a^^, was retested.
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In the SPSS program each
case contained four variables:

treatment (pre = 0, post =
1). dependent measure (B^

,

every other

observation In the original
series), the two condltlonall.lng
observations (Z. , and Z
^
a ^
2n-l
^ '^°°^P"te statement combined
"^Zn+V
g2n-l ^nd
to
calculate
z;
as
^52n+l
given above. Finally, a
regression allysis
was carried out:
the dependent variable with
Z2n
treatment (0, 1)
and the conditional variable,
z; as the independent
variables. The
results of the analysis are
reported in Table A.l.
'

The first part of the analysis
was to verify that no
treatment effect was present for
the original sets of data.

The re-

sults indicate that this was indeed
true, i.e., no significant treat-

ment differences were found for
the original series (see Table A.l).

When the "post-treatment" observations
were incremented by
two, a significant treatment effect
was detected for the series with
P

= -.6

(p

<

.0001).

However, when

p

=

.5,

no treatment effect was

detected, indicating that a positive
correlation resulted in a decrease
of power (this was found to be true
even when the post-treatment ob-

servations were incremented by ten).
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Table 4.1

Analysis of Single
Observation Ti.e Series
Designs
Simulated
Treatment
^ff^^t

Autocorrelation
Parameter
(p)

•6

-•6

•6

•6

Estxmates
.

^01 - ^02

.81

.51

-.85 -.56

-81

.51

-.85 -.56

.046

0892

.33

.0892

01

^02

•24

.23(p<.88)

048

.010(p<.75)

1.76

048

.622(p<.43)

134. (p<. 0001)

CHAPTER

V

DISCUSSIONS AND
CONCLUSIONS

The procedure
outlined in Chapter
HLer in
iii ex^.
h
extends
previous

—-

"

......

curve is not of
intere<5f
xncerest, this method
provides
<=-rn,T.i
^ ^vxaes a simple
procedure
,

pro...

.Ha.

.

^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
The procedure
requires sequential
testing of
k
^^""^
°^ h
hypotheses
which in turn
to

.o« se,ue„U.l

exercised

m

.estin, procedures an.
Hence canMon sHouH
He
testing and Interpreting
tHe HypotHeses.

In general. tHe

^1„

advantage of tHe tecHnl,ue
outlined

here and tHe .etHods
given Hy S„a™i„atHa„
and Alglna (1977) and
SLonton (1,77) over tHe
ARIM .odels described In
CHapter 11 Is
that tHey do not
require 50 to 100
observations tHrougH tHe
series.
This feature .aKes
tHls design extremely
attractive
evaluating
the effect of a
treatment on an entire
classroom. However, a
requirement of tHese multivariate
models IS
Is that
tHat the
rh. number
u
of subjects (N)
exceed the number of
time points (P). .ga,„,
,,,,
usually be met when
entire classrooms are
Involved.
A further

m
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advantage of .His
procedure is that no
restrictive assumptions
concerning the
variance-covariance structure
o, the observations
need to be made.

Discussion;

Procedure

t,.t^

In contrast to
procedure one. procedure
two outlined in
Chapter IV „ay he used to
infer treatment effects
in single case

interrupted time series
designs.

By splitting the
original series

in half (in the case
of first-order
autoregressive error) it was
She™ to he possible to use
the conditional distribution
of alternate

Observations to give an exact
test for the regression
coefficients
as well as the first
order autoregressive parameter.
At the outset.
It may appear that
dealing with only an autoregressive
process and
not a moving average process
Is unduly restrictive.
However, as

other writers have noted
(Slmonton, 1977; Glass et al..
1,75) memory
and habit influences are
characteristic of behavioral phenomena
which makes the autoregressive
process a reasonable model.

Several aspects of the procedure
presented in this chapter
are examined next.
First, the Durbin and Watson
(1950) test for
serial correlation is compared
to the simultaneous test given
here.

This is followed by a comparison
of the overall procedure with
the

methods found in Glass, Willson and
Gottman (1975).

Finally, the

relative advantages and disadvantages
of the model presented here are
summarized.

Correlated errors creates a major difficulty
for the

researcher Interested In analyzing time
series data.

To Ignore this

correlation one runs the risk of Introducing
a serious and unknovm
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bias into the estimates and
.lg„i£i,,„«

earlier a modest serial
correlation of

.4 could inflate

alpha by 18%.
On the other hand, to employ
sophisticated statistical methods
to
deal With this problem when
in fact there was no
correlation among the
serial errors would be foolish.
Thus, a reasonable starting
point
would be to test for serial
correlation In the time series.

Durbln and Watson (1950)
investigated the problem of testing
the error terms of a regression
model for serial correlation.
They
derived a d statistic calculated
from the residuals which gave
a
test of the hypothesis of
independent errors.
d .

The statistic Is

£(Az)^

such that,
Az = Ay - bjAxj- ••• - bpAXp

,

and

oil

p p

For normal independent errors they obtained
the upper and lower bound
for the distribution of

Durbin and Watson, 1951).
yield a relatively small

and tabled the percentage points (see

d

Errors that have positive serial correlation
d,

whereas errors that have negative serial

correlations yield a relatively large

d

statistic.

If a negative or

positive serial correlation is found the researcher would proceed
to
plot the autocorrelation function following the model identification

guidelines outlined in Box and Jenkins (1976).

55

The Durbin and Watson
test would be cabled
out before the
AKIM. models were
applied
the reseatcber was
uncertain about the
extent to which ebe
series contained serial
correlations. The re-Its given by Ogawara
(1,53). applied 1„ the
previous chapter provide an alternative
to the Durbln and
Watson statistic. Several
aspects of the Pprocedure
cedure outlined
onMio^^ uhere represent
Improvements over
previous practices.

U

The most Important
Improvements are that the
test for serial
correlations Is exact and can
be carried out simultaneously
with
tests for the other
parameters of Interest. That
Is, the Durbln and
Watson test Indicates
presence of serial correlations
which must then
be followed by Identifying
an ARIMA model In order
to estimate the
extent of the serial
correlations. Here testing tor
the presence of
serial correlation and the
extent of that correlation are
incorporated into the same test
along with the other parameters
of Interest.

Another Improvement Is that the
model upon which the tests
are based make It possible
to compare the serial
correlations of the
pre-treatment series with the serial
correlations of the post-treatment
series. Often time series work
In educational and psychological
reserach Involve series that are
Interrupted by a treatment.

In these

Interrupted time series designs the
error process may be effected by
the treatment (see Glass et al.,
1975. p. 126).

The Durbln and Watson

test may be used to test the similarity
of the errors process in the
pre- and post-treatment series.

However, this test is asymptotic

while the procedure outlined here for
comparing the autocorrelation
parameters of the pre- and post-treatment
series, Is explicit and
yield exact tests of significance.

56
In order to Identify
a particular ARIma
(p.d.,) „odel the

researcher plots the
autocorrelation function of
the observed
series.
Specific models l„ply
specific autocorrelation
functions.
For example a first
order autoregresslve
autocorrelation function
shows exponential decay
after lag one. On the
other hand a first
order moving average .odel
will give a theoretical
autocorrelation
function Which drops to zero
after lage one.
By comparing the
Observed autocorrelation
function with the various
theortelcal functions the researcher makes
a decision on which
.odel seems best.
The decision Is subjective;
there are no statistical
procedures used
comparing the observed and
theoretical functions. The
actual
identification process Is more
complex than the description
above.

m

That is.

m

addition to examining the behavior
of the autocorrelation

function, the researcher would
also plot the partial autocorrelation
function.
p.

For details the reader may
consult Glass et al.

(1975,

92ff).

This type of identification
procedure may be made more

rigorous by employing the techniques
outlined here.

For example, in

an earlier section in the previous
chapter a test for treatment effect in the presence of a h'h
order autoregresslve scheme Is given.

This test may also be used to identify
the order of the autoregresslve
process.

As before the hypothesis of Interest
Is
H^:

C6 = 0

where the vector Includes the parameters
Yj to
the higher order autoregresslve parameters

S,
^

which correspond to
to 0

.

h

The matrix C

may be specified such that the null
hypothesis is that the highest
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order parameter, a short
sequence of tests .ay be
carried out on
subsequently higher order
parameters until one is found
to be not
Significantly different fro.
zero.
In this case the autoregressive
process would be taken as
one order below the order
of the parameter
for Which the null
hypothesis was accepted,
practice it is rare
to find an autoregressive
process higher than two (Glass
et al.,

m

1975), thus it is unlikely that the
inflation of alpha fro. multiple
tests would be a serious
problem.
In order to make this
identification
technique as efficient as possible
the researcher would first
plot
the autocorrelation function
in an attempt to identify
the appropriate

model.

This would be followed by the
hypothesis testing procedure to

confirm or reject the identified
model.
The second stage in the ARIMA model
identification process

requires determining d. the
identification of the order of the polynomial.

This may be accomplished by testing
the regression coeffi-

cients associated with higher order
trends.

Specifically, if the

second degree coefficients were shown
to equal zero then the initial

assumption that the series lies on a straight
line is supported.

How-

ever, if this hypothesis were rejected,
indicating a second order trend,

then it would be necessary to test the third
degree coefficients.

Although the form of these tests will be
different, the logic is
identical to that found in Chapter III.
This may be illustrated by comparing equations
[A.l] and
[4.34].

If one sets k equal to two then the
regression coefficients

in [4.34] correspond to a second degree
polynomial.

Formulating a

hypothesis that these coefficients are equal to zero is
tantamount
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to testing

ehe presence of a second
degree polynomial.

I, this

hypothesis is accepted and
a similar hypothesis
on the coefficients
in [4.1] is rejected,
the researcher .ay conclude
that the series is
best represented by a first
order polynomial.

Given the discussion In
the section "Tests of
Hypotheses,"
tests for these higher order
polynomial trends would be
straightforward to work out.
For example suppose one
wanted to test the coefficients in [4.34al when k =

The general hypotheses may
be stated

2.

as,

[5.1]

where,

[5.2]

3

= [Z^^
01

I

02

Y]

and C is chosen as,

[5.3]

c =

loo'
10

0

A second test may be done for the
post-treatment series.

In fact,

if

the investigator was not interested
in the exact form of the poly-

nomial, the logic outlined in Chapter III
could be applied here in

order to make a preliminary inference on
the presence of a treatment
effect.

That is, the degree, k, for the pre- or
post-treatment series

(whichever has more observations) could be compared
with the degree of
the polynomial for the entire series.

If these were the same then no

treatment effect would be inferred, otherwise (k
^

?^

p

would be evidence that the treatment had an effect.

k

,) i-iici-t;
total^ there
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Once the model is identified
the ARIMA framework gives
a
maximum likelihood procedure
for estimating the
parameters.
For
example, suppose a first
order autoregressive model
has been identified with parameter
0, such that |ej<l to ensure
stationarity
A
maximum likelihood estimation
procedure would look at the error
variance generated at each
value of 0, as it was
incremented in
steps of .02 from -1 to .1
(see Glass et al.,
p. 127).
The point at
which the error variance is
smallest would yield the estimate
of 0,.
.

To complete the ARIMA
analysis a second set of estimates

must be gotten for the parameters
associated with level

intervention (6) effects.

(L)

and

We may write the first order
autoregressive

model for the pre-treatment series
as

^^•^^^

^

- L =

O(z^.^-L) + e^

,

and the post-treatment series as,

^^•^^^

^t

+

6)

=

ei[z^_^-(L + 6)] + e,.

These models may be put into the general
linear form by applying the
transformation,

t5-6]

y^ = (1 _ 0^)L +

.

The transformed models expressed jointly in
matirx form are,
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yi

1

0

1 - 01

0

•

•
•

y„
p

1 - ©1

0

1 — 01

1

1 - 01

1 -

[5.7a]

•

-p+1

•

•

1 - 01

1 -

'p+q

or.

[5.7b]

Z

X6 +

=

e

For a fixed value of 0, the least
squares estimates of L and

6

are

given by.

[5.8]

=

(X^X)

^

It is at this point that a serious limitation
arises with the ARIMA

models.

In order to estimate L and

must be treated as constants.

6

the elements of the X matrix

However, as discussed earlier, the para-

meter ©1 is actually an estimate resulting from a maximum
likelihood
estimation procedure.

Consequently 0i is subject to sampling error

which in turn introduces an unknown amount of bias into the
second set
of estimates [L, 6].

,
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n>e effect of this bias
on the estimate, b'

several consequences.

=[£«),

have

Specifically, the ordinary
least squares esti-

mate for b may not be
optimal when the errors are
not homoscedastlc.
Secondly, the distribution
of b will not be multivariate
normal.
Third, the classical estimate
of the error variance,
= (j,- [i -

X(X'X)-lx')z)/(N-2) for the
model given by Equation
[5.7, may not have
the required chl-square
distribution, since the matrix X
Is not fixed.
Fourth, the quantity

{N-2}* (b. - 3^)/s

will not have the well known
t-dlstribution.
cerning L and

6

Ihus, hypotheses con-

cannot be tested using conventional
test procedures.

The degree to which the sample
dependent behavior of the estimate of
Q,
and the other higher order parameters
affect the estimates of L and 6

and their sampling distribution has
yet to be determined.
The procedures outlined here avoid introducing
an estimation

bias into the estimates of L and

6

by providing a method for simultan-

eously estimating the autoregressive parameters
(e.g., Q^) and the

regression coefficients.

The conditionalized model contains the auto-

regressive parameters in addition to the regression
coefficients

associated with the pre- and post-treatment curves.

In this model

all the parameters are estimated simultaneously
thereby avoiding the

bias created by the two-stage ARIMA procedures.

Furthermore, as

illustrated, the simultaneous estimation
of parameters makes the

procedure easily implementable through
available regression anlaysis
computer programs such as SPSS.

One consequence of
using the conditlonall.ed
„odel Is that
a certain number of
observations in the series
are treated as constants. The number
depends upon the extent
of the conditioning.
Por
example, a first order
autoregressive process
requires that the observed series be conditioned
on the i^ediatel,
preceding and postceding Observation. This
reduces the nu.ber of
observations upon
Which the estimates are
based by a factor of .5.
Por a second order
autoregressive process the
original series will be
reduced by a factor
of .66.
This problem is discussed
next.

Mathematically, in order to be
able to obtain estimates of
1. the matrix X'X in the conditionalized model
must be of full rank.
This condition of full rank
is met only if the number
of observations
in the reduced series
exceeds the number of parameters,
and no column
of the X matrix can be
exactly expressed as weighted
linear combinations of other columns (Finn,
1974, p. 97).
The conditionalized model
has two subsets of parameters.
One subset are the parameters
associated

with the autoregressive scheme.
model

(

^

=

Nxl

X
^
Nx5 5x1

,

e*.

^

Nxl

autoregressive error process.
eters.

Thus, to estimate

S

Equation
.

[A. 11]

gives the combined

.

^ linear series with a first order

This particular model has five param-

(or a) there must be a minimum of
six

observations in the reduced series.

In actual practice, however, the

number of observations has to be much
larger than that required for
the estimability of ^.
In one sense,

the problem of losing observations to the

conditionalizing requirement is offset by the fact
that the information contained in the "conditionalizing"
observations is used in an
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ancillary

,Hat is. ,y Seating
..ese observations as
consents it is possible to
estimate the parameters
associated with
polynomial trends and
serial correlations.
XH.s. while the analysis
is performed on the
reduced series the
information contained in
the
conditionali.ins observations
is in fact used,
thoush in a different
way.

The major drawback of
the procedure is that
treatment
effects are "washed
washed out
om-" k„
«.u
by the y parameter
when the autocorrelation parameter is
positive
itive.
F
In Table
t^ki^ /4.1,
i
it can be seen that
the
simulated treatment effprf
^'^
^
effect (i.e., augmenting
the post-treatment
series by two) is detected
when p = -.6 but not when
p = .6.
This
asymmetry may be explained
by referring to equation
[4.41], and
the relationship between
p and
•

y.

In the example it was
pointed out that the treatment
effect may be associated
with a^^ and a^^. Thus, from
[4.41] we get

t5.9a]

a,
01

= z

An-1

- ^

2n

^2n+1

,

0

^

'

)

^

^
+ e*^
2n

and

r5.9b]

= Z

a

2n

02

.^n-1

- y
^

^n+l
^

2

^2n

By taking the expectations of
[5.9, a and b] we get.

01

= p

^2n

- Y
'

(

2n-l

^2n+l
9

)

and

a

%z

= u

^zn-

/2n-l +
y

(

0

t^2n+l
)

.

,
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However, because the series
is horUontal the
expectations of .
!z

,

2n-V

_

[5.10a]

2n'

the same; thus,

^2n+l

n

-

ot

N

and

02

When
than p.

p

^2n

^

is positive, y will
also be positive and greater

This follows fro.
y = 2p/(l+p2).

^hus, when

To the extent that
y is large, the quantity 1-y

p

=

.6,

y = .88.

is small which

greatly reduces the difference
between a,^ and a,,.

Unfortunately,

the standard error of a^^la^^
does not decrease rapidly enough
to
offset this.
On the other hand, when
p is negative the treatment

effect associated with a^, and a,^
is not reduced.

That is, the

parameter (1-y) is greater than
one.
Finally, two more points need to
be mentioned.

First, the

procedures require multiple tests
which effect alpha in an unknown
way.

Thus, the researcher must exercise
caution when testing various

aspects of the time series.

Second, while it is mathematically

possible to obtain estimates of

g

with one more observation than

parameters, the number of observations
required in order to get

reasonably stable estimates must wait for
actual data.

Conclusions
Several points

m

the previous chapters.

be .ade about the
procedures outlined
Fi.st. procedure one is
useful when the

ti.e points are .eans
and the researcher is
not interested in the
exact nature of the curve.
Furthennore, the test outlined
in
Chapter III is easy to carry
out and conceptually straightforward.

Procedure two is useful when
the time points are single
observations rather than .eans.
Following the guidelines given
by
Box and Jenkins (1976) it
is reco:n.ended that 50
to 100 observations
are collected. When the
original series is conditionalized,
the

number of observations is reduced
to

pH-q-h/h-fl,

when p and q are
the number of the pre- and
post-treatment observations and h is
the
order of the autoregressive
scheme associated with the error
process.
The major limitation of procedure
two is that it is unable
to detect treatment effects
in the presence of a positive
auto-

regressive parameter.

However, if the researcher is working
with a

process in which the autoregressive
parameter is negative then

procedure two would be appropriate.
The major advantage of the procedure
outlined here is that
it is appropriate for examining
the error scheme.

of the pre-treatment series may be
compared to

series.

For example, Yj

,

of post- treatment

Higher order y's may be tested to determine
the order of

the autoregressive scheme.

These two tests of y may be viewed as a

more rigorous examination of the autoregressive
scheme than the
Durbin-Watson approach or inspection of the
autocorrelation function.
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Tests Of
, 3houla .e done i„ eonJuneUon

„Uh a plot of tHe autocorrelation function rather
than instead of plotting
rhe .orrelosra„
Table ..1 confirms these
conclusions. That Is,
the estimate
P of p, given by

a

= (1 -

accurately reproduces the
original parameter.

-

However, further „orU
clearly necessary 1„ this
area to compare the
sampling properties

of the various estimates
of p that are currently
available.

CHAPTER
Fro.

Tl^

VI

series Analysis to
Philosophical Reflections

In the next chapter,
the

predo^nant .odel of e=cplanatlon
in

the social sciences
(He.pel and Oppenhel^.
1948;

considered fro. a philosophical
perspective.
tional perspective (e.g..
Colllngwood. 1956;

Kerllnger. 1964) Is

Specifically, a relaHarrI and Secord. 1972)

is adopted which focuses
on the notions of "event"
and "action"

social science research.

m

Dray (1957) draws an
Interesting distinct-

ion between the statements,
1.

A's reason for doing x was
y

2.

The cause of A's doing x was
y.

He argues that the difference
between these statements Is point
of
view.
In statement one, the point
of view is that of an agent,
where
agency involves such concepts as
Intention, motive and reason.
On
the other hand the point of
view in statement two is that of
manipulator, where manipulation involves
such concepts as control, detachment

and causality.

point of view.

Here the relational perspective embodies
the agency

Furthermore, the example from Dray
(1957) begins to

make the distinction between two
different approaches to explaining
phenomena;

a distinction which will be drawn
more clearly in the next

chapter.

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight
themes found in

the next chapter by examing the
explanatory efficacy of time series

designs presented in the previous chapters.

The central feature of time series designs is, obviously
67
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p„,,_,,

enoush. ti^.

the „ost central feature
of

writings Of

Hn^

(Kl„.

two concurrent series

^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^

e^irlcal explanation,

i,„).

attest

Multiple

tl^

^^^^^^^

at least .Ince the

series designs which

e^loy

to estahllsh the

te^oral contiguity between
the events In each series
and thereby Infer cause
and effect.
One of
the earliest exaioples of
this type of analysis Is
found In Yule (1926)
when he studied the relationship
between thunderstorm activities
and the
occurrence of sun spots.

A cursory glance at the recent
methodology literature in social
science Indicates that multiple
time series designs have excellent
explanatory power.
Campbell and Stanley (1963). Campbell
(1963), Campbell
(1969). Riecken. Boruch et al.

(1974) and Cook and Campbell
(1975) give

this design high ratings for
dealing effectively with various threats
to

experimental validity.

Ihe major threat to a clear
interpretation of

time series data comes from the
effects of reactivity due to repeated

measures taken on individuals or groups.

This difficulty is overcome

somewhat when the measures are archival
or unobtrusive.
If reactivity is controlled for

then the explanatory

efficacy of time series designs resides in
the close temporal linkage of

experimental events.

However, from the standpoint of agency temporal

contiguity may be a notion that is more ethical
than scientific.

For

example, the participants perception of the
treatment may foster intentions on their part to improve, rather than the
treatment causing them
to improve.

Had the relationships been different between the
partici-

pants and researchers, different intentions (e.g.,
subversive rather
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than

cons„.eave, eouia Have Been
.o.e.e. .,e... .ve.s.n.

Of the ..eat^n,.
ly

m

.^.c.

business.

slgniacance of a particular
seouence of events (or
better stated - actions)
Is »ore of an ethical
consequence than a scientific
result.
i„ the sequel the
Intention of
^ohn Henry to defeat the
stea. pile drlv. Is
contrasted to the threat of

^aansator^ rlva^
p. 232;

to causal Interpretation
(Cook and

Ca^bell. 1975.

Saretsky, 1972).

The substitution of the
word action for event brings
up
another set of points which
.ay be highlighted here.
Since Bridgn^n
(1945) coined the phrase
"operational definition" research
social
scientists have been consistently
changing actions into events.
Similarly. Ki. (19 73) points
out that the notion of "event
classes", like
ten^oral contiguity, is also
central to scientific explanation.
Event
classes involve judgtnents of
similarity which distribute events
into
classes.
Such judgments about events are
central in empirical work
such as time series where the
tracking of a process, classroom or

individual requires repeated judgments
that an occurrence at one time
Is the same as subsequent
occurrences.

Moreover, the appropriate use

of probability theory depends
upon the success of event class logic.

That is, the activity of counting
"events" permit the application of the

probability axioms.

In turn the deductions from these axioms
result in

compelling scientific explanations.
In the next chapter it is argued that
social science event-

bound methodology is limited.

Part of this limitation stems from

70

overloCins agency which
(Magoon. 19„).

is necessary to

.„.he™.e.

U

Is

con^ . hody of knowledge

potenUally unethical eo generate

predictions fro. expert
defined event classes when
the resulting knowledge is either Inaccessible
or unlntelllgihle to
those that the knowledge is about.
in contrast to this the
relational perspective
developed In the ne« chapter
views knowledge of hu.an
events/actions
as mutually Intelligible.
For knowledge to be .utually
Intelligible
It needs to embody connnon
values as well as an agreed
upon corpus of
facts.

Moreover, as will be pointed out,
the line between fact and
value is not clear cut.
Finally, to explicitly infuse
our work with values need not

exclude doing empirical research.
active;

However, the empiricism is inter-

we continually confront results
with dialogue which, by its

very nature, is rich in questions
of fact and value.

It is no

longer the facts that compel us
to accept an explanation but the
dialogue.

This theme is not new.

It is simply a variation on the
theme

that it is the meanings we hold for
things which generates our under-

standing not the facts (Hudson, 1972;

Connolly, 1974;

Magoon, 1977).

In the chapter that follows the metaphor
is changed.

Popper

(1959) likened scientific activity to that of a
crew of sailors busily

repairing individual planks to ensure the
seaworthiness of the ship.
This image of the scientist/sailor shows
them to be unconcerned about

where the ship is going.
The new metaphor is Ouroboros, an ancient Greek snake
that is

eating its tail.

The snake bends around upon itself in a self

reflective posture and

a circle or wheel which
implies .ove^nt.

The head Joined to the
tail represents a unity
between two parts,

l^us Ouroboros as a
^taphor symbolizes the discipline
as selfreflecting, progressing
and achieving unity such
as would be sought
between the researched and
researcher through dialogue.
Both are
parts of the same "body".
The ancient snake is a
richer and more dramatic
image of
science than the wooden ship.
it captures the humor and
tragedy of
our pursuit.
our far reading inquiries what
we discover is ourselves (Baker, 1977).
Through the process of inquiry
we grow to
recognize and obliquely fear
the possibility of our own
death (Berger
and Luckmann, 1967);
the snake devours itself.

m

The sequel contains philosophical
reflections on experimental explanation.

Chapter VII begins with an exposition
of the

"covering law" model of explanation
and then moves to an analysis of
event as an element of scientific
explanation.
"Event" and its philo-

sophical analogue "action" are contrasted
and the implications for

explanation are considered.

Some of these implications are critical

of current practices, particularly
the traditional experimental practice
of separating science from philosophy.

into parts

I

Though this thesis is divided

and II, the parts are juxtaposed, and like
the head and

tail of Ouroboros, they are joined by
a common body.

PART II

PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS

"The fact is the sweetest dream that
labor knows'

Robert Frost

CHAPTER VII
Erklaren and Event

Introduction:

Two PersnerMv^c

von Wright (1971) credits
the German historian-philosopher

Droysen with articulatins
the distinction hetween
^JOa^ (explanation)
and verstahen (understanding)
n.e suhject of this chapter
is
.

the

covering law .odel of
explanation
part of this type of
explanation.

(erJO^)

and event, an essential

tte subject of the next
chapter is

interactive «,dels of understanding
(e.g.. Dray, 1957;
Harre and
Secord, 1972), and the
philosophical and historical
analogue of event,
action.
To begin, a distinction
is made between event and
action.

Collingwood (1946) says,
... By the outside of the event
I mean
everything belonging to it which
can be
described in terms of bodies and
their
movements:
the passage of Caesar, accompanied by certain men, across a river
called the Rubicon at one date, or
the
spilling of his blood on the floor of
the
senate-house at another.
By the inside
of the event I mean that in it
which can
only be described in terms of thought:
Caesar's defiance of Republican law,
or
the clash of constitutional policy
between
himself and his assassins." (p. 213)

There are two points in the Collingwood
quote which need emphasis.
First, he divides observations of
a singular phenomenon into "outside"

and "inside" aspects.

Second, an adequate understanding of the
phenom-

enon includes an analysis of the
"inside" aspect;
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description of bodies

72

and their

™nts

is not sufficient.

.or the purposes of this
thesis
the outside Of an event
will be referred to as
si.pl, "evenf. whereas
the inside of an event
will be referred to as
action.
Events are exter
nal to us as observers, we
stand over against the.,
they are discrete
and enu.erative.
On the other hand, the
core of an action involves
such concepts as .otive,
intention and purpose, and
actions require so.e
form of interaction, whether
the interaction be through
empathy or

actual participation.

To some extent this distinction
between event

and action parallels the
distinction between erkl^ren and
verstehen

.

By dividing a singular
phenomenon into event and action one

risks reinstating a Cartesian
dualism with the accompanying "ghost
in
the machine" (Ryle, 1949).
This dualism divides the self into
body

(observable movements) and mind (the
ghost).

The intentions and plans

of the mind are inaccessible
and one studies actions by watching

behavioral events (Care and Landesman,
1968).

However, 19th and 20th

century philosophy of science (see Russell,
1945 for a survey) rejected
Descartes' mind-body dualism for a monistic
position which dropped the

notion of mind.

In fact two monisms developed, one associated
with

positive science (Camap, 1936;
waite, 1953;

Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948;

Popper, 1959, 1963;

Braith-

Reichenbach, 1968), and the other

associated with recent social philosophy critical of
positive science
(Mannheim, 1936;
1974).

Dray, 1957;

Winch, 1958;

Maclntyre, 1973;

Connolly,

This second position may be characterized by a quote from

Dray (1974),
"To discover and understand their life, we
need to be able to do more than regularize,
predict, and retrodict their actions; we
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LTt^ 1/'
fro^\SJ^°"^^|:°°J,»i8ht
"^^"^ '°

view of them
it,

"^^^ ^
have

standing and evaluation
of human life
the
^^^^^^H^i^lt-^Lagenc^". (original emphall^g)

Discussion Of this second
perspective is contained in
the next chapter.
T^e remainder of this
chapter deals with a concept
of explanation (i.e., erlOaren)
as it is illustrated
by the covering law model
(Hempel and Oppenheim,
1948)
discussion gives attention to
the
explanatory role of event,
particularly to the way probability
theory
defines and uses the notion
of event to "lubricatethe inferential
machinery of applied statistics.
Before introducing the covering
law
model, a brief history leading
up to this model and the
scientific concept of event is given.
Finally diagram 7.1 is provided
to help
.

organize some of the ideas presented
thus far.

Antecedents of Event and Coverin
g Law Model
In earlier times the events
which made up explanations were

linked to religious frameworks
and cosmological systems.

Causes of

disease, deviance and so forth were
attributed to gods, objects in

nature (animism) or magical powers
in certain individuals.

For example,

the African Azande culture practiced
witchcraft and counter witchcraft
to influence such events as love,
hate or rain (Wilson, 1970).

In

many ways medieval metaphysics may
be viewed as the culmination of

methods which linked events to supernatural
forces.

For the scholastics

:
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Two Types of Explanation^

Scientific/Causal (erklaren)

Main feature: Covering laws
or generalizations.

Activities
1.

2.

Isolate causes and
effects

Generalize covering
laws

3.

4.

.

2.

Main feature: Agency and
relational
perspective.

Activities:
1.

Reenactment (empathy)

2.

Dialogue (construct meanings)

Explain effects
(retrospective)

3.

Render action intelligible
(retrospective)

Predict effects
(prospective)

4.

Anticipate action (prospective)

Other features:
1

Historical/Teleological (verstehen)

General
Value free observation

Other features:
1.

Contextual

2.

Value laden observation

Dichotomy is illustrative.
In actual fact a true dichotomy does not
exist
For example. Popper (1963), a scientist, argues
that observation is value laden, not value free.
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a priori notions of
divine forces „e.e
essential to explanations
of

events
The detachment of
events such
events,
Qnr^h as
cause or effect, from
supernatural forces and thee
placement of
nf them on
Placement
observationally neutral
grounds was a slow process.
While ^the^tics was
flourishing since
the Greek period, it
had not .et been applied
to the concrete events
Of daily life (Langer,
1942)
the arena of Bacon
(1561-1626) was
one of the earliest
thinkers to reject the a
priori ^taphystcs of the
scholastics and seek knowledge
that resulted fro„ the
systematic
.

collection of observations.

m

His inductive method sought
to detach

observations fro. any metaphysical
beliefs.

Bacon filled note books

"1th specific observations
from which he attempted to induce
general
Statements about these events.
Another scientist/philosopher who
rejected the scholastic
methods was Hobbes (1588-1679).

Unlike Bacon, Hobbes was a deductivist.

Enamored at an early age with the
power of geometric proof, he believed
that human nature could be
viewed in a mechanical way and thereby
deduce
the specifier.

Hobbes wrote extensively about psychology
as an

objective study of humans as machines,
a study which he envisioned to be
unfettered by scholastic metaphysics.

Only Hobbes and Bacon are mentioned in
the transition to more
objective notions of events among a myriad
of others (Copernicus,
Descartes, Newton, Locke,...) because
they capture two essential parts
of scientific explanation:

deduction and induction.

Although this

methodological aspect of the scientific disciplines
is still debated
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aaUatos an.
,

^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^
^^^^^^^^^

and deduction
l^ortant for the growth
of knowledge (Popper.
1,59;
Cattell, 1966; Medawar,
1969).
The break fro.
scholastic notions was
.uch slower for the
social sciences than the
physical sciences, and wasn't
achieved until
the turn Of this
century.
Major physical science
advances In theory
and technology during
the 19th century created
a wave of optics, for
the fledgeling new
sciences such as sociology
and psychology.
Eager
for similar successes,
social scientists adopted
the methods of physical science (Boring,
1950).
^e explanation of human actions/events
.oved from a divine deter^nlsm
to a scientific determinism.
A major
requirement of scientific
explanation Is that every event
be capable
of consistent labeling
by independent observers.
This positive and

consistent Identification of an
event via observation became
known as
positivism.
For an excellent, though
terminology laden, review of
the various posltlvlstlc
and antiposltivistic positions
in philosophy

and science see Giedymin
(1975).

Auguste Comte (1798-1857) is considered
the founder of posi-

tivism in social science (Giddens.
1974).

He based valid knowledge on

the immediately observable and
rejected introspection.

However, it

was Ernst Mach (1838-1916) who laid
down the fundamental tenets of

positivism for psychology and furnished
the epistemological link between
psychology and physics (Boring, 1950).

Machian positivism goes back

to Hume in its emphasis on contiguity
in space and particularly in

time.

Like Comte, Mach's positivism was
experiential.
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Early in the 20th century
the Vienna Circle
(Schlick, Camap
Hussell, Peisl) ...empted
to establish demarcation
criteria which would
place statements and
events inside or outside
of the science arena
Any statement or event
which may be directly or
indirectly observed (as
part of a theoretical
net) was considered
potentially verifiable.
If
something could be verified,
it was scientific.
Later Popper (1959,
1963) took issue with the verif
lability criterion and advanced
a
falsifiability criterion.
That is, a hypothesis was
scientific if it
was potentially falsifiable.
The members of the Vienna
Circle became
known as logical positivlsts
because the application of the
verification principle was based on
logical considerations.

Gradually the experiential positivism
of Comte and Mach, and
the logical positivism of
the Vienna Circle merged to form
two widespread methodological perspectives
in social science:
operationalism
and behaviorism (Bridgman,
19A5;
1974).

Watson, 1930;

Sidman, 1960;

Skinner,

Operationalization is a measurement process in
which members

are assigned to events or objects
according to some rule (Stevens,
1946).

For example, the definition of acid in
an operational framework

becomes the testing operation of inserting
blue litmus paper into the
solution.

The assignment rule gives the event or
object meaning.

That is, the liquid is acid if and only
if the litmus paper turns red
(Hempel, 1966).

in the social sciences operationalism
means that

concepts such as aggression are defined by
operations: "hitting, slapping, pushing the child without provocation
from that child, and with

enough force to make that child cry"..

Within the operational framework
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events become items on
a list of «k
observable category
descriptions which
may be checked and
later counted (Hutt and
Hutt, 1970).
In the remainder of
this chapter operationalized
events are
examined within the framework
of the covering law
model of explanation

(Hempel and Oppenheim,
1948).

Specifically, the probabilistic
form of

explanation, rather than
the universal form, is
discussed (Hempel, 1966).
certain requirements must
be met before the concept
of event may be
successfully employed in
probabilistic explanations.
In the subsequent
chapter an alternate view
of event is presented
which leads into the
second form of explanation
outlined in Figure 7.1.

Covering Law Model of
Explanation
The anatomy of explanation
is complex (Collingwood,
1946;

Gardiner, 1952;
1959, 1963;

ambiguous.

Toulmin. 1953;

Braithwaite, 1953;

Dray, 1957;

Popper,

Scheffler, 1963, von Wright,
1971) and as Scheffler laments,

Modem difficulties stem from Hume's
denial

connections between matters of
fact.

of necessary

Here our concern is with causal

explanations examined in terms of the
covering law model of explanation

advanced by Hempel and Oppenheim
(1948).

'n.e

roots of this model may

be traced back through Comte and
Mill to Hume (Dray, 1957;

von Wright,

1971).

Popper (1959) succinctly describes the
covering law model,
"To give a causal explanation of an
event
means to deduce a statement which describes
it, using as premises of the deduction
one
or more universal laws, together with
singular statements, the initial conditio ns",
(p. 59, original emphasis)
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e=......„

:

^

1"""°^

"3.

..n

_

-

,
...

^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^

ove„,,,,
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^
and ™ive.sal law.:
„ater expands when
tree.es.

u

H:^la„atlc„ „ay e«e„d
beyond particular
event, such as a
-rst radiator to Include
explanation o. particular
laws.
accomplished h. suhsu^n,
or ..covering, these
laws with more
co.prehen-ve laws.
Kor example, the
valldlt. ol Oallleo's
law .or the tree
fall Of hodles on
earth .ay he subsumed
under Kewton's law of
gravl-"on.
i^ere are four logical
requirements for a covering
law
explanation (Hempel and
Oppenheim. 1948, pp.10-11):

,

!•

The explanandum must
be a

of the explanans.

*

consequence

^'

S^"*"! laws required
Tot the derivation of
for
the explanandum.

3.

Ihe explanans must have
empirical content.

IZ^TT T'

^^^=""^"<=as constituting the explanans
must be
This model Is diagrammed
In Figure 7.2.

model Is also referred
to as "deductlve-nomologlcaV
because of the
logical relationship
between the explanans and
explanandum.
Current formulations of
explanation contain the essential
elen^nts Of the covering law
model as It Is outlined
here, though certain
aapects (e.g., inductive
or deductive) may be
emphasized.
w,at is
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Statements of
antecedent
conditions

logical
deduction

Explanans
L Ll

U
Event

General laws

Description of
empirical
phenomenon to
be explained

Explanandum

Figure 7.2

Covering Law Model
(from Hempel and Oppenheim,
1948, p.H)

co^on a»ong these .odels
A (cause) and B (effect).

are the generalizations
which acco^any events
For exa^le. Popper (1952)
stresses the

Importance of a universal
hypothesis and Gardiner (1952)
discusses the
notion of "regularity analysis"
In which the observed
regularities are
gathered Into a law.
Moreover, the model Is consistent
with Hume's
critique of necessity.
Hume's critique of necessity shifted
the debate about what

constitutes correct causal explanation
from making correct deductions to
justifying inductive inferences.
That is. if the existing generalization, which predicts a specific
event in the explanandum, is in turn

supported by the occurrence of these
events, then the explanation is
justified.

Both deductive and inductive reasoning
are present.

How-

ever, in contrast to Descartes, we
no longer have deductive certainty.

That is, from Hume onwards the
generalizations made from the regular
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connecuon

-ese even..
be

even.

U

^
.Ke

Ko.H.n,

actuaU.

.o..ae. „.e„ ana^olcus

eon.Wn. co-o™„ces
3„a .,e

.ene.aU.aUo.s ...

.eXat.on to .He gene.aU.at.on)
even,

are o.se.ve<..

I„ei.e„taXl„ .M. a.,u.e„t
eonta.n. ..e rationale
observational work as tT^^n
„
well as
replication of empirical
conclusions.

In social science
the

(Cs^bell and Stanley.
1,63;

e^hasis

is clearly on induction

Kerlinger, 1,64;

Cattell. 1,66). nevertheless the .odel for
explanation is essentially
the sa^.
fact
although Popper's work
has been labeled as
"hypothetico-deductive".
he clai^ to be an
inductivist (Popper. 1,70).
i^u.
deductiveInductive split
^y be «„t once Hu^'s point about the i^osslbillty
of showing necessary
connections between matters of
fact is accepted.
The fact that most work
In social science Is
statistical in
nature does not effect the
appropriateness of the covering law
»,del
as a model of social
scientific explanation.
According to Hempel

m

(1966) there are two forms to the
covering law model of explanation:

Deductive-nomological and probabilistic.

ae

deductive-nomologlcal

Is based on laws of universal
form whereas the latter is based
on laws

of probabilistic form.

I„ probabilistic explanation
the explanans

imply the explanandum with high
probability.

For example a probabil-

istic explanation may be schematized
as follows:
The probability for persons exposed to
the measles to catch the disease
is high.

Jim was exposed to the measles.
[makes highly probable]

Jim caught the measles (Hempel, 1966.

p. 2,)

.
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rv""^"

...

^^^^ ^^^^^^

logic nor the role
of evidence differs
aittera fron,
^H ^ found
.
from that
in the deductive

P--"U.. .

.e.

„oe
^ ^^^^^^^^

e,a^,e.
la

axed wHe^eaa
.0

.ea.

^.„aeUa„ geneUcs
.Ke

p.o.aMlU.

.He

o. a

xo .ev.e„ .Heae
.saues

the pu.p„aea
„, .His aUcuaa.on.

p.o.aMlu.

a

ee«a.„

.a„,e .ataZU. „UX va.
He«

.aU
,.o.
^„

p.aHe.

Has an e..eUe„. pape.
on different levels
of probability statements,
and Coulaon (1976)
reviews tHe Historical
develop„.„t of probability
notlona.

The efficacy of a
covering law explaxiatlon
comes from tHe
logical relatlonsHlp between
tHe explanana and
explanandu..
^at'la
the logical relationship
permits predictions to be
made.
However. tHe
Juatlflcatlon for tHls explanatory
force emerges from tHe
observation of
events In the explanans
(I.e.. antecedent conditions)
and the explanandun.
The Inductive nature of
the Justification predudea
proof
(Scheffler. 1963).
Moreover, within the framework
contingent on observed events, the relationship
between the explanans and
explanandum
Is logical.
That Is. If these antecedents
occur and these generalizations apply, then this event
will obtain or la predicted
(universally
or with a given probability)
In the next section,
what-is-observed. or event, is examined.

Of particular interest is the
independent relationships among and
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between even.-as-cause
ana even.-ae-eHect
.e,.,.ea ^o. .He .^.Unation
to succeed.

Event
In this section „e
examine the "status" of an
event vls-a-

vls other events,
particularly event-as-cause
and event-as-effect.
ae
domain of this discussion
Is prohabUlstlc
explanation which Is a type
Of covering law
explanation (Hempel, 1966).

"Event" is a central concept
in probability theory and
hence
a central concept to
probabilistic explanation.
virtually every
graduate level textbook on
statistical inference in social
science
there is a discussion of
the notion of event.
For example. Hayes
(1963) says,

m

" ••• events are sets,
or classes, havlnp
the eleme ntary events as members
The
elementary events are the raw materials
that make up event classes.
The occurrence of any member of event class
A makes
us say that event A has occurred.
Since
an^ subset of the sample space is an
event,
then some event must occur on each
and
every trial of the experiment",
(p. 49,
.

original emphasis)

Savage (1954) defines event as a set
of states where a state is a des-

crlption o f the world, leaving no
relevant aspect undescribed

(p. 9).

Bailey (1971) defines a set as an
aggregation of "objects" where the
objects are mutually exclusive and referred
to as events.

In the con-

text of probability theory we take event
to be like an object;

enumeratlve and thus is distinguishable from
other events.

it is

Moreover,
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it is these

obJec-liUe properties of
events which give the
p.ohahilit.

axlo^ and operations
such

a powerful deductive
range.

A .ajor requirement
of the covering law
model is that eventas-cause and event-as-ef
feet are logically
independent (von Wright.

1"1)

^is
.

is the central part
of Hume's critique of
necessity.

If causes were not
distinguishahle from effects
then the ohservation of

an event-as-effect
could not bear on the
truth value of the law
or
generalisation which connects
cause and effect.
That is. the truth
value Of the laws is not
a matter of logical
necessity, but contingent
on the testimony of
experience (see von Wright,
1971. p.l8).
Por
example, to say that X's
behavior was caused by his
intentions violates
this independence require^nt.
This is because intention
cannot be
defined without making
reference to its object, the
behavior.
In contrast to intention, the
concept "spark" is defined
independently of
explosion, although a spark
may cause an explosion.
Also an explosion
may result from something
other than a spark.
Ihe spark has intrinsic
properties to distinguish it from
explosion whereas intention does
not.

Incidentally Cook and Campbell
(1975) rule out Intentional concepts
(e.g., compensatory rivalry)
as threats to causal inference.

This

point is discussed in Chapter VIII.
While events-as-cause and events-as-ef
fects are logically
independent, the explanandum, as
noted earlier, is logically deduced

from the explanans.

This apparent contradiction may be
resolved by

considering the difference between
the Independent properties of cause
(and/or effect) on the one hand,
and the temporal contiguity of a
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variety of antecedent
conditions with the explanand™.
on the other

ion.

Furthermore the Ueg .ust
be dry.

Once these requirement, are

»et (and possibly so.e
others), then one would
predict an explosion.
Hence the effect (explosion)
Is a logical deduction
of the e:^lanans.
and the spark, as a cause
of the explosion. Is
logically Independent
of the explosion.
Event as it is defined in
probability theory is compatible

with the logical independence
requirement of the covering law
.odel.
Textbook discussions of
probability theory begin with notions
of
event, set and independence
For exainple, Kerlinger (1973)
says.
.

One of the chief purposes of
research
design is to set up conditions of
independence of events so that conditions
of dependence of events can be
adequately
studied, (p. 106)

The well known probability rule
states that if events A and B are
independent, the probability of their
joint occurrence is simply the

product of their separate probabilities.

If this rule holds then

events A and B are said to be statistically
independent

.

A few

examples discussing the notion of
independence will help illustrate how
it is extended to statistical
explanations.

Within the framework of the general linear model
a given
column of the design matrix may not be dependent
on some linear combination of the other columns.

A violation of this requirement prevents

one from obtaining unique estimates of regression
coefficients or the
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effects Of ..n.epen.en..
va..aMes

-is woul.

an anal.s.s of

va.We

context

.e an exa^Xe of the
general .e.ui.e.„.

statistical distribution theo:. that
relevant para^ters are
independent so that point
estimates and significance
regions
.e obtained.
It should be
noted that the independence
attained here is a.ong
the
or
independent variables rather
than between the causes
and effects.
This is necessary in
order to be able to
attribute the effects to
specific independent variables.

„

To illustrate the independence
between cause and effect we

examine the psychometric
model of -LULeixxgence.
intellieencp

it mo
may u
be represent-

ed by the covering law
model as follows,

Cl

C2

Li

L2

•

• •

Antecedent
conditions,
including
test items
Explanans

.

.

.

General laws
including
the construct
of intelligence

- [makes highly
probable]
^"^ent

Response pattern
on intelligence
test

Explanandum
Figure 7.3

Covering Law Model of the Construct of
Intelligence
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The co„3„uce o.
.„.eU.sence

...

^^^^

of test Ite. responses
.snifest 1„ the explanan.u..

trivial point;

^^^^^^

This is not a

so^

„.ite.s have state, that
intelUsenoe is what the
intelXi^ence test .easutes
(Coo.enough.

194,)
„o„,.„.
this is tegatded as an
unacceptable tantolosy.
appealing to factor analytic results and other
construct validation techniques.
-

.

It is also worth noting
that many lte.n analysis
techniques

depend on the notion of
independence.

.or example, the probability
of

a correct response
depends conceptually upon
the difficulty of the item
and the ability of the
testee.
response to an lte» must be inde-

pendent of the items which
precede it.

if this latter condition
does

not hold (and it may not),
then the psychometriclan's
ability to ferret
out the worth of an item from
proportion correct Information
(item
difficulty) and biserial correlations
with total test score (ability)
Is
impaired.

Smnmary
The major point throughout this
discussion has been that the

notion of independence (logical and/or
statistical) is a major feature
of the relationships among and
between events-as-cause and events-aseffects.

Without this independence between events,
the path to clear

explanation is muddied.

In order to conform to the requirements
of

proper explanation, probabilistic
definitions of event present it as
objective and separable from other events.

These generic definitions

of events permit them to be independently
enumerated as well as
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lubricate the inferential
^chinery of statistics.
Futthe^te. it was
ar.uad that the notion of
independence in probability
was co^atible
with the covering law model
of explanation.

In Chapter VIII a second
kind of explanation (see
Figure 7.1)

which contrasts with the
covering law .odel. Is discussed
within this
second model (agent-relational)
the traditional independence
of cause
and effect is questioned.
Through the notion of agency the
cause and
effect are related through use
and rules rather than by
generalizations
connecting distinct referents.

CHAPTER Vlli
Verstehen and
Action

Many advocates of
scientific explanation
argue that tH
only one kind of
explanation that Is
ade
.
»d Oppenhel„,
1948Bral^.
948, Bralth„a.te.
1953;
Scheffler, 1,63;
Nagel 1,70>
.
Explanation
is, ipso facto,
.
scientific.
•

"o„s

^-^-tions

tlons may be given

ent .i„ds

^

explana-

*^^-Lanafor-

^-u

diffe.

f

one may
.
a
Observe A
"^y obse-rv**
crossing the street
^reet.

example,
v^r^r.
From

occurrence may be
explained by referring
to ^h
^ '°
.
^
.

"

y

a.e

„o„

one

.y

hold that the

one point of view
this

^

^^Hses of A's behavior.

a crossed the street
is
in the seouel
an "agent-relational"
point of yie„ is
developed

—-

"
a9.8) refer

alternative perspective
has .een charact-

to nonscientif
ic explanation as
teleological.

.i.

Of explanation is
acco^lished .y referring
to so.e event in
the future
such 3S purpose
(psychology) or function
(hiology)
.

"on

Of teleological
explanation is the danger
of

-tion.

^at

is. the purpose of
an event/action is
discovered after

the action has taken
place;

ive force.

J

Both

He^el

thus this Uind of
explanation lac.s predict-

and Oppenhel. (1948)
and Nagel (1970) reduce
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the difference between
teleological
-teoiogical and causal
explanation to syntax
arguing that a teleological

statement,

'

temperature under
variable pressure alter
their volumes

v!w\f

ure and volume constant,"

may be restated in causal
terms,
"The volume of a gas at
constant temperature varies inversely
with its pressure."

Nagel (1970, p.l08) says
that the difference is
one of selective attentIon rather than of
asserted
content.

He»pel and Oppenhelm (1948)
attribute the popularity of teleological explanation to its
tendency to ^ke us feel like
we "understandwhen a purpose Is articulated.
Verstehen or understanding may
be
traced back to the writings
of Droysan and Wllhelm DUthey
(von Wright.
1971).

According to Magoon (1977) verstehen
concerns the assuinption

that,

... an act's meaning to the actor
can
be explained in at least one way:
place the observer in the actor's
situation and see what meaning he then
gives to the action." (p. 660)

As mentioned earlier Droysan
was the first to introduce the erklaren ""^^^^^^^^ methodological dichotomy
(von Wright, 1971).

For Droysan the

aim of natural sciences is to explain
and the aim of history is to understand.

When something is explained we also increase
our understanding.

However, understanding involves the ability
to empathize and is connected
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wich t„.e„«„„.uey
„he.eas explanation

U

not.
xhe notion of Historical understanding rather
than historical explanation
goes baok to the
time of Descartes.

Gardiner (1959) identifies
the Italian historian
Gan^riastti
Vico (1668-17A4) as one
who opposed
PPUfaea tne
the sci^ntif^
scientific approach advocated
by his vell-known predecessor.
Descartes (1596-1650).
vico rejected
the ^the^tically
inspired Cartesian criterion
of true knowledge.
Specifically he denied that clear
and distinct concepts could
be universally valid or applicable.
Vico rejected abstract concepts
of universal man;
his studies were contextual
and particularistic, and his
style literary rather than
scientific.
Some writers (Gardiner, 1959;

Berlin, 1976) consider Vico to

be the intellectual forefather
of an approach to explanation
in history
found in the works of R.G.
Collingwood and Williajn Dray.
A main
feature of explanation for
Collingwood (1946) is empathy or to use
his
phrase, "reenactnienf.
see it as Caesar saw it.

In order to explain an event/action
we must

The explanation of Caesar's actions
emerges

from the particular circumstances
of Caesar's time.
or covering laws like, given x

Generalizations

A will do y, are not sought in this kind

of explanation.

Dray (1957) argues for a "rational explanation",
the goal of

which is to show that the thing which was
done, was done for the reasons
given (p. 124).

a rational explanation requires a "calculation" of

reasons, where the calculation is similar to a
process of appraisal.
Thus, the explanation of an action involves a
demonstration that the
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action

..e app.„p.i«e „.
„ti„„al .Hi„« eo

,i.e„ the

p„tU.U.

circumstances.
The work of Connolly
(1,74) on the notion of
"contested con-

cepts" .ay be viewed as
an extension of Dray's
argument that different
kinds of explanations
l^ly different points of view.
Por Dray an
explanation which refers to
reasons Involves an agent's
point of view
Connolly (1,M) argues
that the concepts In an
explanation need to
e,*race the various points
of view a^ng those to
which the explanation
is applied.
To the extent that these
points of view are not fully

reconciled, the concepts are
tagged as "contested".

Knight (1978)
review, the notion of
contested concept and Its
l„„llcatlons for psychologlcal methodology.
The framing of an
agent-relational perspective Is potentially

endless, however, the works of
Wittgenstein, Anscombe and Winch must
be
mentioned before the frame Is
called complete.
In his later work.

Philosophical TnvesMf^aflonn.
Wittgenstein departed from strict
referential meaning advocated by the
Vienna Circle and sought to link
meaning
to use.

As Fogelln (1976) points out.
meaning Is established by exam-

ining contingent facts of everyday
life (p. 115).

Anscombe (1958)

,

In her book Intention

,

makes two points that

are relevant to the Introduction
of an alternative point of view.

First, a behavior may have two
descriptions;

one description that is

amenable to causal analysis, the other
which Is amenable to an agent-

relational analysis.
points of view.

Her point Is similar to Dray's about different

Second, she revived Aristotle's practical syllogism

.
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An example would be.

A intends to bring about
£.

(Minor premise)

A considers that he cannot
bring about p
^
unless he does
a.

(Major premise)

Therefore A sets himself to
do a.
sion;
see von Wright, 1971,

(conclu-

p. 96).

While the practical syllogism
is not logically binding
it is an important
part of teleological explanation
and explanation in history
and social
science (von Wright. 1971).
The structure of the practical
syllogism
is analogous
to the structure of the covering
law model of explanation.
The major premise would be the
law-like statement, the minor premise

would be the antecedent condition
and the conclusion parallels the explanandum.

Indeed the practical syllogism may
be seen as the model of

explanation in the sphere of human action.
The work of Winch (i.e., 1958, 1970)
would emphasize the importance of embedding the practical
syllogisms of Anscombe into a social

context.

Furthermore, Winch (1958) argues that implicit
and explicit

rules that participants follow render
actions (e.g., actions contained
in a practical syllogism) intelligible.

To the extent that observers

do not participate in a given context,
observed behaviors and reasoning

patterns may appear irrational.

However, the point of Winch, and the

agent-relational perspective being developed here, is that what
appears
to be irrational may be quite reasonable to someone
involved in the con-

text.

From Wittgenstein to Winch we have come full circle.
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Wittgenstein's later work Phii„= U4
LhUosophlcal,
•
usage base of leaning.

m

,

Investigations

»^k„

„ineh stresses the
Importance ol Involve^nt

a context.

Not surprisingly („i„ch
Is a scholar on
Wittgenstein)
the two positions are
co^U.entary.
Participation In a social context loiplles using
concepts and vice versa.
n.ere are two inrportant
aspects of the agent-relational
perspective worth emphasizing.
First, following Ansconi,e
(1958) as well
as Colllngwood
(1933. 1946). practical syllogls.
or practical reasoning
is open ended and not
binding In the way a logical
syllogls. Is binding.
It see^ that the
"force" of the practical
syllogism arises out of the
social context which renders
the chain of events, actions,
reasons
intelligible.
Ihls is the second point and
is raised by Winch.
Social context with its attendant
rules render the practical
syllogism

intelligible and ultimately give
it its "force".
Already a dark cloud is forming
over the covering law model.
As discussed earlier, the
efficaciousness of a scientific explanation
emerges for the Independence of
the events In the model and the
logical
relationship between the explanans
and explanandum.
However, as

indicated here, the force of the
practical syllogism, the analogue of
the covering law model in the
sphere of human action. Is socially

derived.

More will be said about these points
In subsequent sections.
Ihe open endedness of practical reasoning
and importance of

social context are characteristic of a
constructlvist's perspective
(Miller, Gallanter and Pribram. 1960;

Neisser, 1967;

Harre and Secord.
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-7^^ "

explanation outlined in
Figure
1
g e 7/.I.
tHe Chief

-

....

- ..e„e-.eUUc„.,

3....

^^^^
a.
According
to Magoon (1977)
one

..™p.,„„.
^^^^ ^^^^^^^^

an.

--o„.

.H. „e

con..o„e .He eo.p:e.U.

.e.ea.cHea p.eno.na

,,,,^,„ ^^^^^^^^^^^

.

^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^
involve an account of
.he social con.ext
Indu.lns social .eflni.lons
and rules.
n,e nex. sec.lon
ctlon Is a cr<M
.
critique of. the
covering law nodel
using an example of
purposive behavior.
John Henry versus

Conl.

and Camp hpll

The core of the covering
law model is at.achlng
cause .o
effect through hypotheses,
geherall.ations or laws.
Cook and Campbell,
C1975) as well as Campbell
and Stanley (1966) apply
the requirements of
this form of explanation
to research in applied
settings.
John Henry
was a nineteenth century
railroad construction worker
whose actions are
the subject of speculation
by Cook and Campbell.
The establishment of a
causal explanation in this
literature
is achieved by attending
to four types of validity:
Internal, external,
construe, and statistical
conclusion.
n,e elimination of various
"threats" to these four validities
permits the researcher to rule out
rival plausible hypotheses.
Later, an examlna.lon of .he
threats to
internal validity will provide
insights into the way the covering
law
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model handles
intentional concepts
cepts.

E«.h
Each ^type of validity
functions to

maintain certain aspects
pects of ^ho
the .causal connections
in the explanation
(Cook and Campbell,
1975,
p. 223).

Statistical conclusion
elusion iron^^..
validity concerns the
statistical covariation of cause with
effect
^ect.
Statistical. analysis is
considered
the ,a.e.eepe. .o
causal e:,la„a.,™.
,UHou,H .a.Ueical evidence
no.
3u.acie„. .„ es.a.naH
13
.Ha. A cause. B. .His
.,pe o. ev.Cenca
seen as necessary.
^.ea.s .o s.a.is.lcal conclusion
valldl.y Include
type I and II errors
as well as .He error
ra.e problem.
Po. .^.ailed
reviews Of .hese Issues
.He reader Is referred
.o Kir. (1,72), Ueberman (19 71) and Coulson

U

(1976).

Construct validity concerns
tHe correc. labeling of
cause A
and effect B.
IHe labeling of the
.rea.^n. (cause) i„ the HawtHorne

expert^nt Is the co™.„ example
given

to illustrate construe,
validity.

Music was provided for workers
and .heir produc.ivi.y went
up.
Did
the .uslc cause .He
observed increase in produc.ivi.y
or was i. due .o
the attention given to the
workers by the researchers?
This is a
construct validation question.

Threats to .his .ype of valldl.y
ste.

from singular measure^nt
processes which cannot by then^elves
rule out
irrelevancles. as well as, reactive
difficulties such as evaluation

apprehension and experimenter expectancies.
construct validity;
Cronbach. 1971;

Much has been written on

the reader is referred to
Cronbach and Meehl, 1955;

Campbell and Flske, 1959;

Messlck, 1975.

External validity refers to the validity
with which a causal

relationship can be generalized across
persons, settings and times.
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PopuUUon .ea„U.o„

e«e«

.

„H.cH .He unUs of a„al...s
were ran.o.1, sa^.ed
fro. the population.
^.ea.s .o

e«e™al

vauau,

.„.i..e .He .a..o.
po..Hle interaction, of
varlaHXes sucH
as selection and
maturation with the f.o.^
,
treatment. (see
Campbell and Stanley. 1966)
Close tie between
Internal and external
validity in
Campbell and Stanley
(1966, Has dra™ some
criticism f.om sucH writers
as BracHt and Glass
(1968) and Snow (1974)
i,,ey discuss a notion
called ecological validity
which empHasi.es natural
variation and descriptive analysis as
opposed to the controlled
variation and inferential metHods advocated
by Campbell and Stanley
(1,66). and CooR and
Campbell (1975).
.

.

Finally, internal validity
refers to the validity of an
Inference which leads to the
stateir^nt that A caused B.
internal
validity is the major concern
because the demonstration of a
causal
relationship among events is
paramount in scientific explanation.
Campbell and Stanley (1966)
remark.

Internal validity is the basic
minimum
without which any experiment is
uninterpretable ... Internal validity is the
sin qua non (p. 5, original
emphasis).
The defense of causal explanation
and ultimately the covering law model
is made on the territory of
experimental validity, particularly inter-

nal validity.

It is time to penetrate that
territory.

In general the list of threats
to each of the four validities
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provide, the researcher
with a

Plausible rival hypotheses.

by which he or she

rule out

Through this language „e
co«unlcate and

criticize experimental findings.

while this see^ llKe a reasonable

procedure, closer scrutiny o,
these threats shows a way of
talking
about hu^n behavior that
Is at best peculiar.
1„ particular, this
shows up in the arena of
Internal validity, the center
stadium of scientific explanation.
In order to develop this
point we trace the list
of threats to internal validity
through the works of Campbell and
Stanley to Cook and Campbell.

Originally Campbell and Stanley list
eight major threats to
the "internal" interpretation
that A caused B.

The more "external-

aspect of the interpretation that
this A caused this B is a labeling

problem (see Cook and Campbell,
1975, p. 226).

The internal threats

are well known and originally listed
as:
1.

History

5.

Statistical regression

2.

Maturation

6.

Selection

3.

Testing

7.

Mortality

4.

Instrumentation

8.

Interactions with selection

For the sake of discussion we label this
original list of threats as
"class A" threats.

Approximately ten years later Cook and Campbell

(1975) extended the original list to include:

10.

Ambiguity about the direction of causal inference
Diffusion or imitation of the treatment

11.

Compensatory equalization of treatment

12.

Compensatory rivalry

13.

Resentful demoralization

9.
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lA.

Local history
(pp. 228-229)

^ese Six addUicnal

threats a.e labeled 1„
the sequel as "class B"
threats.
since these threats are
less fa^Uar they are
briefly
described below.

The exa^le given for
threat #9 co.es fro. a
hypothetical
correlational study In which
It Is difficult to
establish whether less

fore^

supervision causes higher
productivity or higher productivity

causes less

fore^

supervision.

In

^y

e:<perl.ents the direction
of causality Is clear
fro,n the banner In which
the Independent variables are applied and the
dependent ^asures subsequently
collected.
That Is. experl,.ents l,„ply
a teinporal sequence whereas
a correlational
Study often does not.

Threat #10 results from informational
channels overlapping
and thereby confounding
inferences which might be made about
the
inrpact of the treatment.

For example, evaluating the impact
of an

instructional package about sex education
for adolescents in a 5-week
follow up would be confounded if during
that 5-week period the local
rock station ran a campaign against
teenage pregnancies.

Other mani-

festations of this threat are when
participants in the treatment talk
to participants in the control.

The New Jersey Negative Income Tax

Experiment faced this difficulty in their
efforts to establish compara-

ble control groups (Rossi and Williams,
1972).
Threats 11-13 are similar.

Concern for #11 stems from the

possibility that a worrisome administrator would
compensate the control
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concern

o.
^^^^ ^^^^^

When a pa.Uapene

^^^^^^^
.,e

con.oX

.„ .He presence o. .He

-^rau.a.„n
Sroup are

^^^^^^

.eacUon o. .He

.ea.ene.

.n.o,...

a.

Hen.,, ove.

On .^e o.Her Hana
resene.nX

...^^^^^^^ ^^^^^

.e.raK.a Heca.e

.Hn

^^^^^

^^^^^^^

.He. are no. rece.v.ns.
and pre.u.aHl,

benefiting frc, .He
.rea.men..
Finally, a .hrea. .ha.
arises fro» local Hls.ory
concerns
"Hat Happens a. a
^^^^^
s.rategy Is .o randomize
out these
.hese r.r^hi
problems. However, the unit
of
analysis (e.g., neighborhoods)
may preclude eliminating
eH,n<„ w
some possible
interpre.a.ions due .o local
history.

...^

first step In .He
analysls/crl.lque of In.ernal
validity
la a general comparison
of class A threats with
class B .hreats.
All
Of .he class A .hrea.s
are el.Her experimenter
controlled (3-6) or are

somehow external to the
control of both the experimenter
and subject
(1,2.7,8).
For example,
the latter set. History Is
a category for
all the extra or Incidental
events which occur be.ween
the pretest and

m

posttest.

IHese events are seen as
"everything else that happens",

and in that sense they are
naturally occurring and outside
of the control of the experimenter
and participant.
Effects due .o Hls.ory are
ruled out through randomization.
It could be argued that mor.all.y
is a result of a par.lclpan.'s
choice to leave the experiment and
thus
under their control.

However, .he language used .o
discuss mor.all.y

excludes that interpretation.

For example.

.
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aegSlltz.

This Is a threat when
an
effect .nay be due to
the different kinds
of persons who dropped
out of partlcuUr
treatment groups during
the course of an
e^erlment. (Cook and
Campbell, 19?5,

T^^t is. mortality Is
Interpreted In dispositional
ter™ ("different
Mn^s of persons") where the disposition,
which Is external to the
person, causes the
attrition.
Even If this last point
Is not accepted
»ost elements of class
A threats are subject
to experimenter control
and are external to the
participants In a way which
contrasts sharply
With the class B threats.

An inspection of the two
i-ww Liasses
classes or
of i-hr-^o^
threats uncovers a
striking difference.
Class B clearly emphasizes
agency, relationship
and context, whereas class
A does not.
For example, "diffusion of
treatment" Is relational;
subjects talk to each other.
And 'tompensatory rivalry" Involves
the notion of agency;
John Henry Intended to
drive more spikes than the
steam machine.
Local history Involves the
particular context surrounding the
phenomenon under study.

Only

threat #9 (ambiguity about the
direction of causal inference) seems

slightly different from the others
in class

B.

be made for the relational aspect
of this threat.

However, a case could
It has been point-

ed out by Knight (1976) that the
constructs of similarity and attraction
are relationally bound to each
other.

This creates a conceptual

dependency which makes it inappropriate
to state "similarity causes

attraction" or "attraction causes similarity"
In the Cook and Campbell discussion of
class B threats, the

102

notions Of a.enc..
.eUt.on.Mp an. eontex. a.e
„ea.e.
a nagaUve
That is. these notions
-y.
a.e threats to causal
explanation and it
therefore desi.ahle to
eli^nate the.
xhis is not surprising
ilven the tenets of the
covering la„ ^,^1 of
explanation.
As discussed earlier the
concept of intention as
a cause violates the
requirement that cause and
effect he logically distinct.
An intention has »eanlng only
insofar as it refers to a
behavioral outcome
Which would be the effect
of the intention.
while it is usually
fruitful to fit pheno«„a
into a scientific model,
the way in which
this is accomplished
through
gii the
cne Class
class B
R threats
t-hr-o.*seems strained and
unnatural.

U

Let's examine the case of
John Henry.

Saretsky (1972)
describes a tall, brawny
railroad pile driver that worked
so hard to
out perform a steam drill
that he died of over exertion.
This is
the well known story of
John Henry.

Cook and Campbell (1975) cite

John Henry's efforts as an
example of compensatory rivalry
(threat
i?12,

class B).

However, the explanation of John
Henry's actions in

"compensatory rivalry" terms weakens
the possibility of a causal explanation.
In this situation we wish to
attribute the outcome, B,
(greater number of spikes driven
into the ground) to cause Al (human
effort) or cause A2 (machine effort).

We need to eliminate the

possibility of compensatory rivalry in
order to make a correct causal
inference.

In spite of one's desire for a
correct causal inference

it seems reasonable to argue
that John Henry Intended to defeat the

steam spike driver.

And to the extent that his intentions were
framed
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Within ehe „„ge

Ms aMU.Us.

™

asent-.eUtional explanation see.
app.op.iate than a causaX
explanation which would seeU
to eliminate
the Intentional terms.

-re

A defense of the explanation
by cause would separate
the
"true" effect fro. the
spurious effect resulting
fro. intention.
While
John Henry defeated the
machine (intentional effect),
the machine is
better than human labor
(-true" effect).
this exan^le the spuriousness of the intentional
effect stems from the fact
that John Henry's
efforts far exceeded normal
human efforts.
Presumably most could not
Wield a hanger as well as
John nor could John maintain
his efforts; he
died.

m

However, the separation of
intentional effect as spurious in

order to identify the true effect
does not always make sense.

For

example, in a case of teachers
using the old teaching method versus
the
teachers using the new teaching
method, the intentional efforts by one
group of teachers may be far more
important than the causal impact of
the program.

In such a case the true effect
would indeed be the conse-

quence of intentional effort.

Ironically, the only real threat in the

John Henry example may be the threat
to his job posed by the machine.
Finally, the language required to maintain
a causal explanation in the face of class B threats
seems cumbersome.

For example,

"It is also possible for reactive research
to result in real but uninterpretable

treatment effects, especially when persons
in these groups compare themselves to
others and guess how they are supposed to
behave (in many situations it is not
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difficult to guess what
is desired
P^^^^P"
education,
o^ in
^n^''i^^^^
industrial
organizations).
ihe
problem can best be avoided
by making
hypotheses hard to guess (if
there are
any;
by decreasing the
general level
of reactivity in the
experiment, or by
deliberately giving different
hypotheses to different respondents.
(Cook
and Campbell, 1975,
p. 2 43)
.

.

.

,

They go on to admit that
these are only partial
solutions, since inspite
of the researchers
efforts, respondents are not
passive.
Still the
disturbing implication lingers
that if one could somehow
eliminate such
things as intention or
reactivity a pristine causal
explanation would
emerge.
What is disturbing is an image
of a completely non-reactive
person whose behavior is explained
by causal notions.
The major argument in the
critique of internal validity is
that it attempts to eliminate
notions of agency, relationship and
context from the explanation of
events.
In the sphere of social action
(e.g.. John Henry) it seems
more appropriate to use these concepts
than to eliminate them in order
to meet the requirements of the
cover-

ing law model.

Furthermore, the implicit recognition of
intentional

concepts (class B threats) generates a
cumbersome language with dis-

turbing implications.

The next section discusses the event-action

distinction.

Event or Action ?
There is no rule which categorizes an occurrence
as an event
or an action.

Indeed the same occurrence can be both;

instead, the
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Ubel Of even, or acUon

.

(Coia„.„oo.. 1,33.
von Wright, 1971;

,,3^^

Connolly
1974^
^^y> 1974).

^^^^^

^^^^^^^ ^^^^

a
^
,
As
Dray (1957)
has put it, the

two statements about
the same thing,
1.

A's reason for doing
x was y

2.

The cause of A's doing
x was y,

differ in terms of their
point of view.

Statement one reflects an
agency point of view
whereas statement two
reflects the point of view
Of manipulator or
predictor which involves such
concepts as
control

and detachment.

Collingwood (1946) describes
Caesar's crossing of

the Rubicon in terms
of,

a)

ance Of Republican law.

his physical movements,
and b) his defi-

The second description
requires reference

to Caesar's intentions
and takes the view point
of agency through a

"reenactment" process.

The differences between
event and action

may be outlined as follows:
TABLE 8.1

Event or Action

Event

Action

^^^^i^ti^^
Features:

P°int of view: Agent-relational
Features:

1.

Bound to physical
movements

1.

2.

Objective and
enumerative

2.

Conceptually distinct

3.

3.

Bound to purposive concepts
Intersub jective and ambiguous

Conceptually dependent

106

Na.«aU..

..e

..„e.„ces .e.een eve.

ences between .he two
.o^els of e:,U„atlon
outUnea i„ n^ute 7 1
With these distinctions
in ^nd let-s
.eexe^ne .ohn Henry's
defeat of the ^ohine.
„as it an event o.
an action.
if
wete
an event out perspective
would he predictive.
Because it is UUely
that .ohn. out Of a
desire to .eep his
Joh. hehaved (acted, in
an expected way. we are ahle
to ^.e a prediction
in this particular
case
However, as covering law
theorists, we would seeU
generalisations to
other cases and thus
would seek to ^nipulate
the situation in order
to »ake other successful
predictions.
Furthermore our description
Of his behavior would
be tied to physical
movements; any reference
to
intentions as cause would
violate the requirement
that cause and
effect be logically distinct.
To the extent that a
predictive point
of View would lead us into
the manipulation of other
jobs and to the
extent that the description
could not legitimately refer
to intentions,
John Henry's defeat of the
machine as an event is unsatisfactory.

u

Incidentally the "manipulation" of
jobs would be acceptable if it
took
place within an agent-relational
perspective rather than a predictive
perspective.
By treating the defeat of the
machine as an action an agent-

relational perspective is implied.

The explanation of his actions

would not emerge out of the
specification of antecedent conditions and
general laws.
Instead, through an agent-relational
perspective,
intentions would be sought.

Intentions would be soug^t:by questioning

the agent, John Henry, and those
around him.

However, if the agent
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is no l„n,e. aXiv..
as

the case here and
in Historical Investi^at
ions

intentions wouia be bracketed
through a ..reenact^nf
process described
by Colli„g„ood (1946, and
Dray (1,57)
^e questioning process is
mtersubjectlve and contains
exiguities with i^ortant
i^lications
.

that are discussed in the
next section.

Thus to understand aohn
Henry

action „e view hi. as an
agent acting according to
plans, intentions and
purposes.
IWo strategies were suggested
to "observe" the intentions,
a)

reenact.e„t and

b)

questioning.

Due to the intersubjective
nature

of the questioning process
and the conceptual relationship
between
intention and behavior (von
won Wrieht
i-u^
wrignt, ly/l) the
perspective on John Henry's
actions is more agent-relational
than it is predictive.

Before considering an exantple
where the occurrence is better

described as an event, a brief
connnent on intention is necessary.

quently an agent acts without any
awareness of an intention.

FreThis

does not present a serious
difficulty for the agent-relational
perspective.

As Dray (1957) argues many actions
are found to be perfectly

intelligible by those involved in the context.

In such cases the

action is in a state of "explanatory
equilibrium"

(p. 125);

need an explanation.

Here the concept of intentionality is not
needed.

Intention becomes a vestige;
ingful function.

it does not

it still exists but no longer has a mean-

It is plausible that the societal structure
in

highly integrated communities could completely
displace intentionality
from the individual level to the social level.

However as soon as an

individual's action is less than perfectly intelligible
(in less inte-

grated communities) a need for an explanation arises.

The intentional
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vestige Is revived.

To reoain
i
regain ^
explanatory
equilibrium we seek the

asents reasona lor
acting 1„ tHe manner
o.servea.
B. diacoverlng tHe
agent's calculations,
the action hecomea
Intelllglhle and explanatory
e,ulllhrlum reeatahllahed.
Xo go lurther Into
the nature ol Intention
would require a review
of .reudlan notions,
which Is clearly .eyond
the purposes of this
discussion
aiscusslon.
u~
However, two Incidental
points are
worth noting 1„ passing
that castle.
First, the ellcltatlon
of reasons and Intentions
In psychotherapy occurs
situations where the "explanatory
equilibrium" has
been disturbed.
Second, the restoration of
psychological equilibrium
as wall as explanatory
equilibrium Is accomplished by
considerable

m

attention to social context.
Including personal histories.
"Jones crossed the street";

drcu^tances we would classify

event or action?

Under ordinary

this as an action and explain
It by

referring to the tobacco store
across the street and the Intention
of
Jones to purchase a new pipe
(see Peters. 1958 for additional
discussion
of this exa^le)
However these are not ordinary
times and it may be
.

that Jones is under threat
from a terrorist gang and has been
forced to
cross the street.
The event "crossing the street"
is conceptually

distinct from the cause "terrorist
threat".

Although the terrorists

may have a purpose in mind when
they forced Jones to cross the
street,
the relationship between the
presumed cause and effect Is literally

physical (coercive) and not directly
determined by their purposes.

Furthermore it Is quite meaningful to
describe "Jones crossing the
street" in terms of physical movements
rather than in intentional terms.
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Although some aspects
cioFct-ts or
of this example
FJ-e nlarc^
Place t-u^
the ^
occurrence into the
even, caceso..
o.He.s .„
^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^
the dee„.p...„
^^^^^^^^
^^^^^
^^^^
agent-relational.
That is,
ie
^at
because Jones understands
that the people
with whom he is dealing
with are terrorists
crrorists Us
fas nn
opposed. to actors) he
Choose. „o. .o .es..
ehe.. ...eats.
ehls case .He po.n. o.
view
on .ones- behavio.
,e a.en.-.ela.ional
..ou^h .He e:,Xana..on
is
causal.

A case In which .he ev*>Ti*event, "t
Jones crossed

.he s.ree.", implies
a predictive poln.
of view as well as a
causal explana.lon. Is .he

following.
the street".

™

suppose we observe Jones
"hopping spasmodically across
clearly this

of crossing the s.ree.
doesn'. see.

to fit ordinary
expec.a.lons for s.ree. crossing
behavior.

Perhaps
Jones is listening to a
transistor radio as he walks
along the sidewalk.
The newscaster is reading
the lottery number for
the million dollar Lo.o
Canada prize.
I. is Jones' nu^er and
he hops Joyously, though
spasmodically, across the street.
However, it may be that the news
of the
Win proved .00 much for Jones
and caused a hemorrhage in the
mo.or coordina.lon cen.er in his brain.
Tke hemorrhage causes him .0
«,i.ch
and move randomly, and by
coincidence .0 move across .he s.reet.
I„
.his case, as before, a
description of his physical movements
is mean-

ingful and his movements are
conceptually distinct from the cause of
these movements.
Moreover his behavior is predictable from
this particular kind of hemorrhage.
Finally It would not be meaningful to
take an agent-relational point of
view towards .he even. "Jones crossed
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the street" In this
examole
xanple.

Th-^ ,Is the
v
That
relationship between Jones'

behavior and the cause
(he^rrhage) is entirely
causal.
Before leaving this
set of exa^^les it
is t^ortant

to note
that an agent-relational
perspective toward e^lalning
actions does not
exclude prediction and
cause.
the case of an.
occurrence which
involves physical .ove^nts
there are always causes,
the covering
law .odel sense, of
that .ove^nt.
However, in ^ny cases it
is „ore
appropriate to descrihe the
action in ter»s of purpose,
intention and
so forth rather than
attesting to find efficient
causes (Maclntyre.
1971)
Nevertheless the efficient
causes are always present
and
necessary in a cosElete
description.
However, they are not sufficient;
indeed the concepts associated
with the agent-relational
perspective provide the sufficiency
and render the description
^aningful

m

m

.

(Peters. 1958).

m

the last section "question
asking" as a funda-

tnental part of the
agent-relational perspective is examined.

Asking a Question
There is a well known anecdote
about a famous philosopher.

From her deathbed she sat up to
speak for the last time, "What are
the
answers?"
Her companion, also a philosopher
of reputation, responded,
"What are the questions?"

Ihere is little doubt that the friend's

response had an impact on the dying
philosopher, though it is difficult
to know the exact nature of
the impact.

The point of the story is

not that one should establish
appropriate questions before seeking
answers, although that would certainly
be important to do.

Instead

Ill

the point

U

that th. ,uesUons
„e as. o£

shaue up. .He., .oncep^a.
,.3.e„„,

otHe. „a. .Hin. an. even

„eU

as o..

,„esUon asU
ing is interactive and
a significant part
of social dialogue.
Heidegger remarked. "We
- mankind - are a
conversation."
the discussion that follows „e
explore this interactive
aspect of question asking as well as how the
particular question influences
the answers we

^

m

seek.
In a 1969 Request for
Proposal (RFP) the Office of
Economic

Opportunity (OEO) asked the
following question,
"Does the cognitive and
affective development of primary-grade school
children who
have had Head Start experience
differ
significantly from that of comparable
children who have not had such
experience?"

The Westlnghouse Learning
Corporation of Ohio was awarded the
contract
and set out to answer this
question.
A short year later an answer was
filed which touched off an
emotional and technical debate that
has lasted for a decade.
The tenor of the Ohio Westinghouse
report on Head

Start was negative.

However, advocates of the program claimed
that

OEO asked the wrong question.

Because the individual Head Start pro-

grams were quite different it would
have been more useful to know which

individual programs were successful rather
than whether or not Head
Start as a generic compensatory educational
program was successful.

Caplan and Nelson (1973) also emphasize the
importance of

attending to the level at which the question
is asked, though in a
slightly different context than the preceding
example.

They argue
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that ps^cHolosicaX

„se„eH

„„ .o.,.,

^ ^^^^^

ward pe„„„ centered
e^cplanatlon. .athe.
.,a„
explanations.
Thel.

a.st conce™

u

„Uh

^^^^

p.oble. deflnUion.

First what Is done
about a problem
depends on how It is
defined.
The way
the
tuTlltt
"r"^"
attempts
at

detenS^er'

remediation - or even
whether such attempts
wlU be made - by
suggesting both the foci
and the technL
of intervention-^ by
rulmfsSr

nalX"arisr°^""""^^
Problem definition and
the way a question Is
framed are complimentary
processes.
T.e question that one
asks exposes the level of
problem
definition that one is working
at, whether or not that
level is explicit.
Furthermore, the explication
of level of problem definition
determines the questions that
will be asked.
TH. darker side of their
thesis points out that the
requirements of the covering law
model
channel the problem definition
to the person centered
explanation,

mis

limits the inferential
potential of the findings which in
turn
influences the kinds of programs
that are established to meet
various

social needs.

This is a variation of Kaplan's
(1964) Law of the

Instrument: give a small boy a
hammer, and suddenly he discovers
that
everything needs hammering.

Gardiner (1961) makes a more general
point concerning the
researchers responsibility to frame
the research question correctly.
He says.

Many, apparently Insoluble, problems
arise because of the indef initeness
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n-r

aa.di„a..

''^'^^f^'^ce
1-r.

to any particular
context

U.e

Caplan an. Helson. po.„.s
ou. ..a. a question,
such as
•^^y did World war I oocurr.
1. answerable on
different levels.
1.

2.
3.

the level of Individual
purposes
the level of national

policies

the level of economic
trends.

Furthermore, Gardiner (1961)
operates within the causal
framework implied by the covering law
model by arguing that the
different levels of
questions and answers are actually
different levels of generality
achieved by the explanation.
Caplan and Nelson (1973) are less
ex-

plicit about their acceptance or
rejection of a covering law type
explanation.
l^ese points may be subsumed under
a concern for external validity.

That is, they reflect a concern
for the extent to

which the results generalize to
the population embodied in the
question.
While all of these examples concern
the relationship between
the question and explanation,
these relationships are discussed within
the framework of the covering
law model of explanation.

Furthermore

the questions in the examples
discussed above were research questions

asked by the investigators, as opposed
to questions asked by the researcher of the participants in the study.

The next set of examples move

the questioning process into the
agent-relational framework by consider-

ing an interesting argument by Buss
(1977) in an unpublished manuscript

lU
on causes s„d reasons
in attribution
theory

Here we move Into the
under-emphasized interactive
tive asoerf
„f ,k
aspect of
the researcher-researched
questioning process, a
fundamental part of data
collection.

Buss (1977) argues
that the actor-observer
attributional
differences (.ones and
Nisbett. 1,72) are a
result of the Mnd of

explanation required by
"answerees" (actors or
observers) to respond to
the questions.
.ones and Nisbett (1972)
present evidence that actors
and Observers give
different causal attributions,
situational and dispositional respectively.
Buss (1977) argues that
a question put to an
actor about their own
behavior calls for a
qualitatively different Uind
of explanation.
They [the actors] are
attempting to
provide a rationale for their
actions.
They are attempting to make
their
actions Intelligible to others.
In
short, they find themselves
In such a
situation where a reason, and not
a
causal, explanation of their
actions
are required.
(Buss, 1977, p. 17,
original emphasis)
As Buss points out this is
a conceptual rather than empirical
criticism
of the actor-observer difference.
This conceptual disagreement stems

from the fact that Buss allows
for a second kind of explanation,
reason
explanation, whereas for Jones and
Nisbett the actor and observer explanatlons are both causal.
This example Illustrates a case In
which the Interaction of
the content of a question with
the person questioned generates an explan-

ation which is (and must be) logically
different from a causal explana-
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tlcn.

Moreover, certain attribution
studies cited by Buss
overlooked
this category shift and
were subject to
(Justifiable) crltlcls. on that
basis.
Thus to ask so^one to
explain their actions/behavior
Is to
ask a ,uestlon about the
reasons (I.e.. Intentions,
plans, etc.) for
their actions, rather than
a question about the
causes of their behavior.

On the basis of this
-conceptual finding" Buss
(1977) develops
a Conversion Model of
research in the social sciences.
The role of
the researcher would be to
convert causes to reasons through
a self-

reflective process at the individual
level (e.g., psychotheraphy) and
the social level (e.g..
political involvexnent)
Clearly his argument
moves the explanatory point of
view from one which seeks causes to
one
.

which seeks reasons.
if not identical,

discussed here.

Moreover, this latter point of view
is similar,

to the second type of explanation
(agent-relational)

Next we look closer at the questioning
process

within an agent-relational point of view.
Question asking is. ipso facto, an interactive
process.

More-

over, the request for information is
no longer easily carried out by
the would be questioner.
level;

Difficulties are encountered at nearly every

a trend which may be interpreted as
compatible with an agent-

relational perspective.

Petersen and

Novick, 1975;

For example, test ethic committees (see,

Novick and Ellis. 1975;

AERA Proceedings.

1978) are studying the complicated issues surrounding
the meaning and

use of measurements (Messick, 1975).

The California court case con-

cerning the disproportionate number of minority children
in educably
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ties.

school psychologists
.ust be „uch „ore
explicit about how a
test score is used
before
L^cj-me a chiiH
cniid can v
be tested
T^^*--t
tescea.
Testing jis one kind
of request for
information.

Employment applications
may not ask for race,
sex or age
because these are ruled
irrelevant to qualifications
for employment.
social psychologists must
obtain informed consent
before asking research
participants to state beliefs
and opinions.
Even survey researche rs
need to be sensitive to
the type of questions they
ask, else risk a
painful slam-the-door-on-the-foot
incident.

A closer look at the
interactive aspect of question
asking
shows a dependency between
the questioner

and the answers obtained
which

beguiles causal analysis.

However, an agent-relational
perspective

recognizes this dependency of
the "factual events" established
through
questioning.
Within the framework of a relationship
(e.g., interpersonal, cooperative,
superordinate-subordinate) the question-answer
process engenders a self-reflective
thought process which infuses the

interaction with a certain kind of
ambiguity.

'

Hampshire (1975) says,

When a person, thinking about a question,
still does not know what he thinks about
it, he may be told by a friend
that what
he thinks is so-and-so and, being
told,
he may agree that this is what he
thinks,
and even that this is what he had been
thinking, though he did not admit it to
himself. ... Perhaps the confusion in his
mind cannot be conveyed by any simple
account of what he believes: perhaps only
a reproduction of the complexity and
confusion will be accurate (p. 123).
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U

a^iguuy

not eli^nated;

hc„eve.. the maintenance
of an Inter-

action would foste. stable
and .eanlngful
Interpretations of the questions and answers.
^is notion of a^i.ult. created
the Interaction
between a questioner and
,uestlonee
he further Illustrated
with .ore
detail fro. Hampshire's
philosophical arg^ent and a
study fro. psychology.

,

Stuart Hampshire In an essay
titled "Some Difficulties
In
Knowing" (in S cience and Inq
uiry) Illustrates the
Impact of a question
such as "What Is your attitude
toward this?" (e.g., going
to Italy),
when the question calls for
a response.
His first point Is that the

process of thought is both a
coming to be sure or to know
that something
is to be the case and a
process of making It the case.
Second,
the

raising of a question changes
the agent's state of mind.

Hampshire says,
"What is your attitude to
to Italy)
places me in
a position of facing both
with the need to confront
already are, and with the

—

this?" (e.g., going
an ambiguous position

ways;
I am confronted
the facts, as they
need to make a decision,
for I may dissociate myself, with a
second-level
desire or attitude, from the desire or
attitude
which I find that I already have.
The request
for information forces me into this position
of
active self-consciousness; and the asking
of
the question may change the facts by
engendering
this self-consciousness (p. 44).

An empirical example of Hampshire's argument
is found in a

study of couple relationships by Rubin and
Mitchell (1976).
ples of the questions they asked are:
1.

Who would you say is more involved in your
relationship - (
or you?
)

Two exam-
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or you?

Fro„ a

'

'^°8">'" "

(

)

PC.
^^^^

^^^^

process of as.ln, ,.estio„s
fre,u.„Uy changes the
relationship of the
couple participants.

questions raised
ou.^m'^ """'^f^^'
questions
xn the participants'
own minds
''^''"^^
tlTu"''/''
that had not previously ^^^^^ relationship
been raised.
in
order to answer the
questions, the participants had to engage in new
sorts of thinking
and sometimes in searching
examinations of''

Clearly from this example
of Hampshire's argument, we
can see that the
actual process of asking a
question alters what were the
facts of the

situation before the question
was asked.

This point presents diffi-

culties for causal explanation
which necessarily assumes that
the facts
are obtained by methods
independent of the facts themselves.

Often current research practice
seeks to eliminate the impact
of relationship because it
violates fundamental assumptions of
causal
explanation, (e.g.. Cook and Campbell,
1975).

The researcher seeks

an impartial, unbiased vantage
point and often accomplishes this with
a

detached, professional facade.

However, such a stance frequently

implies a superordinate-subordinate
relationship with the people in the
study (Ingle, 1977) which in turn
influences the conclusions about
their actions.
The point here is not to try to eliminate
the effects of the
f

119

relationship ...ough .ore
e^e.l.ental manipulations
.u. .athe. .e expllc
it about the nature
of the relationship
and view the conclusions
accordingly.
Moreover, hy explicating
the relationship, the
researcher .ay
consciously reject a
particular
relationship (e.g., superor.inate
subordinate) and see. another
kind of relationship (e.g..
cooperative)
within Which to as. questions
and conduct the research.
.or example
When questions are asked
within the framework of an
interpersonal relationship the impact of the
questions is mutually felt.
That is, any
Changes that occur as a
result of the questions effect
both parties.
This kind of argument is
found in the works of MacMurray
(1961) and

Friere (1970)

.

Thus question asking becomes
a constructive nro..... in-

stead of a means of establishing
factual events about an existing
reality.

The arguments to this point
have indicated that an inherent

ambiguity in the question asking
process is an important factor in explanation despite the fact that it
threatens the validity of causal
explanation.

Furthermore, a successful embrace of
this ambiguity re-

quires adoption of an agent-relational
point of view.

In the consid-

eration of the relationship between the
questioner and questionee, issues
of a social philosophical nature are
inevitable.

For example, a

causal approach which seeks to eliminate
dependencies associated with

relationships and also involves manipulation of
the environment and control of rewards implicitly recapitulates
relationships of, for example

large industrial corporations.

Thus, for the industrial manager who

controls the environment and rewards, an ejcperimental
approach may be
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appropriate.

However
cwever, i-i,^
the causal analysis
of social program
,ay not
be appropriate when
they embody
J different
iiierent kinds
klnH» off relationships
,
than
experimental relationships
MPS.
For example, it may
not be appropriate
evaluate the success
of a cooperative
business with experimental
methods because the
kinds of relationships
involved in each differ
TO be sensitive to
actual and potential
research relationships is
to
adopt an agent-relational
perspective
F
peccive.
Th. ambiguity
kThe
in the questlonmg process cannot
be resolved, instead
the ambiguity is
e„.raced
through the maintenance
of an interaction.
Ihe interaction may be
labeled as a certain kind
of relationship
(superordinate - subordinate
'
cooperative), and within
this framework the agents
foster stable and
meaningful Interpretations
of their questions and
answers.

-

•

In this section we
have considered one of the
central activities of research;
asking questions.
The initial examples
illustrated
the impact of the
question on the answers sought.
THe subsequent

examples attempted to show
that the process of asking
a question of
another person moves the
researcher into an explanatory
framework which
is more agent-relational
than causal.
That is the "events" gathered
by the question asking
process in order to build an
explanation are not
independent of the questioner.
^is kind of dependence is related to
the dependence discussed
in the section on event and
action.
That is.
John Henry's intentions are
not independent of his behavior,
nor are
his intentions independent
of his relationship with the
researcher who

brought in the machine.
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Recapitulation
Earlier themes were:
1.

°'
ca^egori'e: of''°'T
^^l^ation:

logical

^^^^
broad
causal and teleo-

2.

^ausal explanation (covering
law model) dominates the natural and
social sciences.

^'

^^^P^^^tive components of
cri'l^'''^/''J°'''
causal
and teleological explanation,
are alternate descriptions of the
same occurrence.

4.

The self-reflective process
engendered by the
question asking process creates
an inherent
ambiguity.

5.

To choose an explanatory
model is to choose a
point of view, e.g., teleological -v
agentrelational.

Maclntyre (1973) presents a series
of short examples which illustrate
two problem areas in the
traditional model of explanation.
are:

(a)

-^ese areas

ability to predict, and (b)
characterization of the actions of

others; this is the recapitulation.

Maclntyre (1973) illustrates the limitations
and indeterminacy in prediction by examining the
decisions made during a poker game.
He says.
The first of these [limitations] derives
from
that element in the belief of agents which
Involves beliefs about the beliefs of other
agents, including beliefs about the beliefs
of others about their own beliefs and actions.
... Secondly, there is the familiar phenomenon of the self-confirming or self-disconf inning prediction - i.e., the prediction whose
chances of truth or falsity are changed by the
act of making or publishing it. (p. 330)
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The point is that it
is not possible for
one agent to

li^. ..e possibilities that .ay be opened
up by the reflections
of the other agent
Regularities (generalizations)
.ay be observed in .ore
con^licated
interactions, however,
recognition that the regularities
have been observed may in turn change
the j-nteraction.
interaction
tk
Thus
new, unexpected
"regularities" are created.
Maclntyre (1973) argues that
the characterization of
the
actions of others is an
interactive and interpretative
process.
The
example that he uses is the
expression of resentment.

Imagine that
a friendly colleague gave
your recently published book
a mediocre
review.
You know that he particularly
prizes an expected invitation
to the dean's forthcoming
party;

fruit;

that he loves to eat a certain
rare

that he strongly desires that
a resolution of his should be

passed at a faculty meeting.

You may express your resentment
towards

him through all or any of these
actions: intercepting his mail;
ing up the entire stock of rare
fruit for the season;

him at the faculty meeting;
ing him down.

buy-

voting against

or by a more direct action such as
knock-

On the other hand, you may express your
resentment

towards him by befriending a third person
whose book he also reviewed

hostilely.

Or you may do any of these actions without
being in the

least motivated by resentment.

The conclusion that Maclntyre draws

is that knowledge derived from the
observation of overt behavior may

not accurately characterize the action.
These two illustrations of the limitations of causal
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explanation move the researcher
re«?PaT-oK^^

*
fr™

asent-reUtlonal point of view.

a predictive point
of view to an

x„.,..,

generalizations
Which are Invulnerable
to upsets ste»lns
fro„ the l^llcatlons of
agency for prediction
and the characterization
of action, the

researcher enters Into an explicit
relationship with the
participants.
The
particular context of the
relationship and the maintenance
of Interaction supports the various
rational explanations given.
if the context and interactions
change then the efficaciousness
of the explanation
given would need to be reexa^ned.
^,aclntyres (1973) conclusion is
that the explanations of
actions given by a social
scientist face the
sa^e limitations as the
explanations of that action given
by a lay person.

Coda
Chapters VII and VIII traced the
development of two explanatory traditions;

one is currently followed in many
areas of social

science, while the other is debated
in political science, philosophy
and history.

These discussions have indicated that
an agent-relation-

al point of view is a more meaningful
approach to explaining occurrences

in the sphere of human affairs.

The limitations associated with a

predictive point of view stem from

explanation (event or action)

,

(b)

elements in the explanation, and

(a)

the nature of the elements of the

the independence-dependence of these

(c)

the consequent difficulties which

the predictive point of view has in
characterizing such occurrences as

John Henry's defeat of the machine and Jones
crossing the street.
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nnall.

a consideration o,
.He

,nesUo„ aa.ing process also
supported

an agent-interactive
point of view.

To be true to Ouroboros.
we attempt to

co^ full circle
T^e thesis began with
a study of issues
and new procedures in
ti,ne
series analysis.
it is appropriate
to end with so.e
speculations on
how a time series design
could tit
couid
fif- into an
agent-relational point of
view.
The context for these
closing exa^les is a classroom.

A
teacher is examining a
student's behavior/actions
over time.
A
series is plotted; what the
student does is transformed
into events
for graphing purposes.
This practice would follow
the tenets of the
covering law model of explanation.
Perhaps a treatment would interrupt the sequence and its
impact studied through the
analytical procedures outlined in chapters III
and IV.
Concurrent with these data
the teacher would record
descriptive dialogues with the student
about
the studentb behavior at each
time point.
These dialogues would be

relational and recognize the interactive
aspect of characterizing
actions.

The pattern of these dialogues would
be compared to the

trends observed in the plotted
behavioral events.

For example, one

might compare the pattern of agreements
in the dialogue about the
action descriptions with frequency of
the behavioral events.

Perhaps,

in a given context it would be reasonable
to expect that the incidences

of descriptive agreements would increase
as the frequency of the

behavioral event decreased over time.

Also such a procedure would

meet some of the requirements of "thick
description" called for in
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ethnology (Wilson,
1977)
^T, .
77) and in
constructivistic research
(Magoon, 1977)
A -re interactively
con^lex utilisation
of a ti:. series
design would require
the teacher and fh, .
the student
to plot their own
behav
as wen as the
hehavlor o. the other.
^o
ol series w<
would
be Obtained.
Por example, one
plot

^

^ght

he the teacher's
self-

-tlns Of

the amount of
encoura.e^nt given to the
student and a conco^ltant rating of the
student's attention.
si.lUrl.. the student

would self-rate the
extent to which the. are
pacing attention and rate
their perceptions of
the amount of encouragement
they are getting
the teacher.

^e

basis for dialogue.

from
pairs of series could be
compared and provide a
If the simultaneous
self-other rating proved too

cumbersome It would be possible
to obtain the two sets
of curves through
peer ratings.
That is. a friend of the
student would make the attention-encouragement ratings and a
colleague of the teacher would
make
Similar attention-encourage„.nt
ratings.
ihe ratings could be done
during classroom times or
made from video tapes of the
classroom.
The

selection of a friend and colleague
to do the ratings would help
maintain a relational point of
view.

We have come full circle though
passing time, at least, ensures
that „e have moved.
Robert Frost ended a poem about a
walk in a garden
with,
"I end not far from my going
forth."

APPENDIX A
Covariance between e

and e

n

n+k

n+1
-n+k - ""n+k-i +

From [A.IJ and

[A. 2]

^<Vn+l>

'

the covariance of e

n

and e

n+1

is
"

^[%(Pen^^„+i>3

= PE(e„^) + E(e„c_^^^)

Errors are uncorrelated with
previous observations, hence,

^<Vn+l>

=

From [A.ll and tA.3] the
covariance of e

^<Vn+2>

n

and e

n+2

Is

=^^(PVl^

= P^a2 using the previous
result.

From [A.l] and

rewrite
k

n

e^_^j^_^

[A. 4]

the covariance of e

k

and e

n+k

is

as e^ through k-1 recursive
substitutions, yielding pCp^'^e

md hence,
E(p^e e

n

,

n%')

k

= p^a2
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n

)
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stationaruy re,ul.e.e„t
that |p|<l

.elated to the fact
that the lagged covarlancea
in the series Is
a power function of
the lag
is Clear that if
|p| „ere greater than one
the covarlances at
higher
lags would quickly become
very large.

U
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